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ABU GHRAIB
DIANE MARIE AMANN†
Seared now into memory is the image of a black-hooded figure
standing atop a box.  He is naked beneath the black robe that drapes
outstretched arms, from which wires run to some unseen source of
electricity.1  Digital scrapbooks of Americans’ abuse of this man, and
of others at Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison, became public just hours after a
government lawyer had assured the Supreme Court that no detainee
endured torture at U.S. hands.  The image eviscerated that assurance.
The man soon became the faceless face of Abu Ghraib; “Abu Ghraib”
itself became a catchphrase for the dark underbelly of the United
States’s detention policy since September 11, 2001.  Government re-
ports released in the wake of the disclosure told unsettling truths.
Abuses were not due solely to acts by rogues of low military rank, nor
were they aberrations at a single prison.  Abuses occurred at many an-
titerror flashpoints—even at the Executive’s showcase center at
Guantánamo—and with some sanction from the highest ranks.  And
though victims were dispersed across the globe, each suffered within
the same perverse vacuum:  a space so freed from the constraints of
law and decency that abuse became possible, even, perhaps, inevita-
ble.
This Article asks how that space came to be; more precisely, how
the U.S. Executive succeeded in maintaining a zone governed almost
exclusively by a singular will to extract information from anyone
† Visiting Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles, School of Law;
Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law (Martin Luther King,
Jr. Hall).  Aspects of this Article were presented in May 2004 at the Collège de France
in Paris and at the annual meeting of the Law & Society Association in Chicago, in No-
vember 2004 at a University of Pennsylvania Law Review Symposium on conflict of laws
and at law faculty colloquia at UCLA and Washington University, and in February 2005
at a colloquium sponsored by the Dean of the Faculty at the University of Southern
California.  Thanks are due to all who contributed during those sessions, to Richard L.
Abel, Kevin R. Johnson, James C. O’Brien, and Clyde Spillenger for comments on a
draft, and to the France-Berkeley Fund for its support of this research.  This Article is
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1
For the first of countless publications of this photograph, see Abuse of Iraqi POWs
by GIs Probed , CBS, 60 Minutes II (Apr. 28, 2004), at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2004/04/27/60II/main614063.shtml [hereinafter 60 Minutes II Report].
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thought to know anything about the enemy.  The Article shows that
this space was the self-conscious creation of the Executive, which as-
serted that the country was at war, and that in wartime, courts must
bow to a boundless and unreviewable presidential prerogative.  Ini-
tially, courts opted to defer to much of this argument, and so rein-
forced the Executive’s construct.  Then, however, a trilogy of Supreme
Court opinions issued in June 2004 appeared to catch the Executive
short.2  Coincident documentation of widespread detainee abuse,
combined with the release of internal memoranda that evinced delib-
erate executive construction of law-free zones of detention, provoked
a popular outcry that seemed likely to apply a further brake on the de-
tention policy.  In the months that followed, though, little seemed to
have changed.  One onshore detainee was sent home,3 but two others
remained in legal limbo.4  A few soldiers were prosecuted for detainee
abuse, but generals implicated in government reports were not, and
high-ranking civilians won promotion.  Trial courts pressed the Su-
preme Court’s order that the Executive accord rudimentary rights to
detainees, but the Executive proceeded as if no such order had been
given.  Contributing to this state of affairs were many factors, not the
least of them the stymying effect of the campaign that led to reelec-
tion of the President responsible for the policy.
This Article underscores a different, less evident factor.  It attrib-
utes the persistence of the policy of detention to a lack of vision re-
garding legal constraints.  At the moment terrorists attacked on Sep-
tember 11, there was no absence of law.  Norms and doctrines,
enforcement regimes, and compliance mechanisms comprised a
2
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004);
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
3
Yaser Hamdi was released after three years in custody.  See, e.g., Joel Brinkley &
Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Releases Saudi-American It Had Captured in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 2004, at A15.
4
The case of José Padilla remained pending as this Article neared publication.  A
federal judge granted Padilla a writ of habeas corpus and ordered that he be released
by mid-April 2005.  Padilla v. Hanft, No. Civ.A. 2:04-2221-26A, 2005 WL 465691, at *13
(D.S.C. Feb. 28, 2005).  The Attorney General suggested that the government might
return him to the ordinary criminal justice system instead.  Richard B. Schmitt, U.S.
May Still Charge ‘Enemy Combatant,’ Gonzales Says, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2005, at A10.  Also
in the brig in South Carolina was Qatari citizen Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, who lost a
bid to have his habeas petition heard in Illinois, the site of his initial arrest.  Al-Marri v.
Rumsfeld, 360 F.3d 707 (7th Cir.) (holding that Illinois court had no jurisdiction given
that petitioner was in custody outside the district), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 34 (2004); see
also U.S. Supreme Court Won’t Hear Terrorism Case, AP ONLINE, Oct. 4, 2004, Westlaw,
APWIRES database (indicating that with Court’s rejection of petition, al-Marri would
need to refile his challenge in South Carolina).
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complex map of laws concerning detention and interrogation.  These
ranged from the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the laws of war5 to the
common law’s habeas corpus guarantee, and were domestic as well as
international, recent as well as deeply rooted.  Yet key actors—civilian
executive officials, judicial officers, and military personnel—went
about their work with blinders on.  Failing to apprehend the existence
and import of multiple sources of pertinent law, they acknowledged
no clash among those laws nor any need for the reasoned resolution
of such clashes.  Persons charged with making, evaluating, and im-
plementing policy thus looked to some laws and ignored others.  At
times the choice of law seemed driven by little more than institutional
default:  the executive lawyer tended to privilege presidential power;
the Army officer, military regulations and the Geneva Conventions;
the judge, the principle of judicial review.  Even among the nine Jus-
tices, laws deemed pertinent varied considerably, as did the interpre-
tations placed on those laws.  Moreover, most of the Justices, like most
military personnel, embraced essential pillars of the Executive’s con-
struction; for instance, the Executive’s designation of disfavored de-
tainees as “enemy combatants” and its insistence that its campaign
against terrorism constitutes a “war.”
Conflict of laws might have offered a legal framework for analysis;
however, this field, grounded in doctrines benefitting the nation-state,
proved ill-suited to the task.  The same was true of public international
law, the field to which conflicts often cedes transnational matters.
The result has been regrettable; indeed, to use the Army’s own term,
“reprehensible.”6  Pervasive failure to comprehend potentially appli-
cable laws enabled the Executive to maintain its zones of detention.  It
may have led some Justices to deny a citizen protection that otherwise
would have inhered under national law.  And it left the implementers
5
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Ge-
neva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Ge-
neva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
This Article refers to these four conventions collectively as the Geneva Conventions.
The United States ratified these conventions in 1955.
6
See Interview by Dan Rather, 60 Minutes II, with Brigadier General Mark Kim-
mitt, Deputy Director of coalition operations in Iraq, available at http://www.cbsnews.
com/stories/2004/04/27/60II/main614063.shtml.  For further discussion of this in-
terview, see infra text accompanying note 17.
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of executive policy—among them, the military police on guard at Abu
Ghraib and the intelligence officers who conducted interrogations at
Guantánamo—in a place without law, where inhumane treatment of
detainees came to seem acceptable.
I.  TERRORIST ATTACK, EXECUTIVE DETENTION
Following the terrorist assaults of September 11, 2001, the United
States struck back against the Taliban regime that had provided Al
Qaeda safe haven in Afghanistan.  Thousands were captured, among
them Taliban fighters and Al Qaeda operatives, as well as others who
said they were noncombatant bystanders.  The desire to detain them
indefinitely gave rise to the Executive’s policy of detention.7
A.  Guantánamo
Exactly four months after the attacks in New York and Washing-
ton, a cargo plane delivered the first group of captives, hooded, shack-
led, and clad in lurid orange jumpsuits, to cages erected inside the
military base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.  Eventually the cages of Camp
X-Ray gave way to the cinder-block structures of Camp Delta, as Guan-
tánamo became the premier site at which the U.S. Executive subjected
captives to interrogation, without access to family or counsel and with
little hope for release.  At one point the detainee population ap-
proached 700.  Detainees reportedly came from dozens of countries.
They may have been as young as eleven and—according to the claim
of one released detainee—as old as 105.8  International objections
were swift and loud.  Critics tended to disregard the many hundreds
7
For accounts of the events and legal developments that preceded Supreme
Court review, see Diane Marie Amann, Guantánamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 263,
266-85 (2004).
8
On the elderly detainee, see Todd Pitman, Karzai ‘Surprised’ by Advanced Age of Ex-
Detainees, Sending Delegation to Guantanamo:  Spokesman, AP WORLDSTREAM NEWSWIRE,
Oct. 30, 2002, Westlaw, APWORLD database (stating that two released detainees
claimed to be 90 and 105, respectively, and that they “appeared to be at least in their
late 70s”).  On the youth of some detainees, see Ian James, U.S. Officials Still Holding
Juveniles in Guantanamo Prison for Terror Suspects, AP ONLINE, Jan. 31, 2004, Westlaw,
APWIRES database (stating that the youngest of three just-released youths “could have
been just 11 years old at the time” of his capture); John Mintz, U.S. Releases 3 Teens from
Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2004, at A1 (stating that after the release of three
boys aged 13 to 15, seven boys aged 16 and 17 remained at Guantánamo); see also
Melissa A. Jamison, Detention of Juvenile Enemy Combatants at Guantanamo Bay:  The Spe-
cial Concerns of the Children, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 127 (2005) (analyzing ex-
ecutive detention of minors in light of international norms).
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held at the Bagram prison and elsewhere in Afghanistan, as well as
others at the CIA’s so-called undisclosed locations.  They aimed their
attacks at Guantánamo:  the fact and terms of detention, they said,
conformed neither with U.S. criminal procedure nor with procedures
spelled out in the Geneva Conventions.  The Executive deflected
these complaints, maintaining that detention was essential in the fight
against what it described as a new kind of national security threat, a
“new paradigm.”9  Thus did Deputy Assistant Attorney General John
Yoo explain:  “What the Administration is trying to do is create a new
legal regime.”10
U.S. officials insisted that no court of the United States, let alone
any other enforcement mechanism, possessed the power to make
them give non-Americans at the offshore base the benefits of the rule
of law.  The cases of Yaser Esam Hamdi and José Padilla, two Ameri-
cans suspected of terrorist activity, required a slightly different tack:
conceding that the reach of the U.S. judiciary might extend to U.S.
citizens held extraterritorially, the Executive designated these two
“enemy combatants” and sent them to a military brig in South Caro-
lina.  Like the Guantánamo captives, Hamdi and Padilla also endured
incommunicado detention and unimpeded interrogation.
Challenges to detention were filed in national and international
fora; at first these efforts were unsuccessful.  The U.S. Executive re-
buffed demands of extranational bodies such as the Inter-American
Commission for Human Rights and the U.N. Working Group on Arbi-
trary Detention.11  A rare public entreaty by the International Commit-
tee for the Red Cross had no effect; nor did that Committee’s many
9
An early public use of this term occurred in GEORGE TERWILLIGER ET AL., THE
WAR ON TERRORISM:  LAW ENFORCEMENT OR NATIONAL SECURITY? (Federalist Soc’y
Nat’l Sec. White Papers, 2003), at http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/Terrorism/
militarytribunals.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).  Documents disclosed years later
showed that executive officials were using the same term at the same time.  See, e.g.,
Memorandum re:  Humane Treatment of Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, from
George W. Bush, President of the United States, to Vice President et al. 1 (Feb. 7,
2002) [hereinafter Bush Memorandum], available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.02.07.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2005); Memorandum re:
Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict
with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, from Alberto R. Gonzales to George W. Bush, Presi-
dent of the United States 2 (Jan. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Gonzales Memorandum],
available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.25.pdf (last
visited Mar. 22, 2005).
10
Warren Richey, How Long Can Guantanamo Prisoners Be Held?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Apr. 9, 2002, at 1 (quoting Yoo).
11
See Amann, supra note 7, at 275-76, 321-22 (discussing U.S. response to these
initiatives).
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private pleas.12  National courts inside and outside the United States
judged themselves without jurisdiction to enjoin the U.S. Executive.13
Then, nearly two years after the opening of Camp X-Ray, the Supreme
Court announced that it would review the federal cases.
B.  Abu Ghraib
At the April 2004 argument in Hamdi, Justice John Paul Stevens
asked Deputy Solicitor General Paul D. Clement:  “But do you think
there is anything in the law that curtails the method of interrogation
that may be employed?”14  “I think that the United States is signatory
to conventions that prohibit torture and that sort of thing,” Clement
replied.  “And the United States is going to honor its treaty obliga-
tions,” he added; yet he saw no “basis for bringing a private cause of
action against the United States.”15  Clement thus reaffirmed the ad-
ministration’s pledge to abide by its obligations under the Convention
Against Torture—including prevention of “‘acts of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to tor-
ture’”—even though it did not welcome judicial review of its con-
duct.16  Oral arguments ended at lunchtime, and the trilogy of deten-
tion cases rested under Supreme Court advisement.
12
See Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Criticizes Indefinite Detention in Guantánamo Bay, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 2003, at A1; Operational Update, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Guan-
tanamo Bay:  Overview of the ICRC’s Work for Internees (Jan. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Red
Cross, Overview], available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList74/
951C74F20D2A2148C1256D8D002CA8DC (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
13
See Amann, supra note 7, at 274-75 (describing extranational litigation).
14
Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633
(2004) (No. 03-6696), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_transcripts.html (last updated Mar. 16, 2005).
15
Id. at 49.  Clement mentioned only the Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A § 1350 note) (allowing private
lawsuit by person who suffers torture at hands of agent of a “foreign nation”), a statute
that he correctly stated would provide no basis for relief.  Transcript of Oral Argument
at 49, Hamdi (No. 03-6696).
16
Letter from William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense, to
Patrick J. Leahy, United States Senator 1 (June 25, 2003) (quoting Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Punishment, opened for signature
Dec. 10, 1984, art. 16, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, at 19 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (en-
tered into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]), available at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/06/letter-to-leahy.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2005); see
also Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1299-1300 (9th Cir. 2003) (repeating govern-
ment’s argument that courts have no power to review the Executive’s conduct of de-
tention “even if the claims were that it was engaging in acts of torture or that it was
summarily executing the detainees”), vacated and remanded by 124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004);
George W. Bush, Statement by the President on United Nations International Day in
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Hours later, viewers of 60 Minutes II were confronted with a color
photograph of a bare-legged man cloaked in black.17  “Americans did
this to an Iraqi prisoner,” CBS correspondent Dan Rather declared.
The image still on the screen, he continued:  “According to the U.S.
Army, the man was told to stand on a box, with his head covered, with
wires attached to his hands.  He was told that if he fell off the box he
would be electrocuted.  It was this picture and dozens of others that
prompted an investigation at the U.S. Army.”  The screen then moved
to other photos, as Rather said:  “The pictures show Americans, men
and women, in military uniforms, posing with naked Iraqi prisoners.
There are shots of the prisoners stuffed in a pyramid.  And in most of
the pictures the Americans are laughing, posing, pointing, or giving
the camera a thumbs up.”  Viewers then saw Rather in an office, his
back to the camera as he looked at a video screen.  On it was Brigadier
General Mark Kimmitt, deputy director of operations for the U.S.-led
coalition in Iraq, who said of the photos:  “What would I tell the peo-
ple of Iraq?  ‘This is wrong.  This is reprehensible, but this is not rep-
resentative of the 150,000 soldiers that are over here.’  I’d say the
same thing to the American people:  ‘Don’t judge your Army based on
the actions of a few.’”  Public outcry spread as the images, and more
like them, appeared and reappeared in newspapers and magazines,
on television, and on websites throughout the world.  President
George W. Bush quickly registered his “‘deep disgust’”; Secretary of
Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld called the conduct “‘totally unaccept-
able and un-American’”; and Congress convened a series of hearings.18
Although rumors long had swirled of detainee maltreatment by U.S.
personnel on the battlefield, in Afghanistan, and even at Guan-
tánamo,19 officials echoed Kimmitt’s assertion that the abuses were the
Support of Victims of Torture (June 26, 2003) (“I call on all governments to join with
the United States and the community of law-abiding nations in prohibiting, investigat-
ing, and prosecuting all acts of torture and in undertaking to prevent other cruel and
unusual punishment.”), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/
06/20030626-3.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
17
60 Minutes II (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 28, 2004).  Described here is a
video clip available for viewing at 60 Minutes II Report, supra note 1.
18
Thom Shanker & Jacques Steinberg, Bush Voices ‘Disgust’ at Abuse of Iraqi Prison-
ers, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2004, at A1 (quoting President Bush); Bradley Graham & Char-
les Babington, Probes of Detainee Deaths Reported, WASH. POST, May 5, 2004, at A1 (quot-
ing Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld); FDCH E-Media, Rumsfeld Testifies Before Senate
Armed Services Committee, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8575-
2004May7.html (last visited May 3, 2005).
19
See Amann, supra note 7, at 280, 323-29, and authorities cited therein; see also
LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, IMBALANCE OF POWERS:  HOW CHANGES TO U.S.
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regrettable fault of a few soldiers at Abu Ghraib.  But even as “Abu
Ghraib,” already infamous for its use as a torture site during the dicta-
torial regime of Saddam Hussein,20 was becoming the shorthand term
for excesses of executive detention, further revelations undermined
any claim that abuse was limited to that prison alone.
Disclosed less than a week after the CBS program was an internal
Army report which found that “numerous incidents of sadistic, bla-
tant, and wanton criminal abuses were inflicted on several detainees”
at Abu Ghraib; among these were incidents of kicking, punching, and
other physical abuse, coerced masturbation and other sexual humilia-
tion, forced nudity, and the use of unmuzzled dogs as weapons of in-
timidation.21  The report by Major General Antonio M. Taguba attrib-
uted the “systemic and illegal abuse of detainees” to “several members
of the military police guard force.”22  Yet it refuted the claim that only
these rogues abused detainees, and only at this prison.  The report
found, rather, that the Army’s and “Other US Government Agency’s
(OGA) interrogators”—the latter typically a reference to the CIA—
“actively requested that MP guards set physical and mental conditions
for favorable interrogation of witnesses.”23  At the behest of OGAs,
guards “routinely” held unidentified captives, Taguba wrote; at least
LAW & POLICY SINCE 9/11 ERODE HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 49 (Sept. 2002-
Mar. 2003) (discussing news reports “that U.S. interrogators are using psychological
and physical coercion,” and that “prisoners have been transferred for interrogation to
states known to use torture”), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/
loss/imbalance/powers_chp4.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2005); Letter re: Arbitrary De-
tention of Presumed Members of Al-Qaeda at Guantanamo Bay, from Sidiki Kaba,
President, International Federation for Human Rights, to President-Rapporteur,
United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention OHCHR (Jan. 22, 2002) (as-
serting that “detainees are being subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment”),
available at http://www.fidh.org/article.php3?id_article=1488 (last visited Mar. 22,
2005).
20
See John F. Burns, How Many People Has Hussein Killed?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26,
2003, § 4, at 1 (discussing Abu Ghraib’s use during Hussein’s regime); John F. Burns,
Hussein and Mobs Virtually Empty Iraq’s Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2002, at A1 (describ-
ing Abu Ghraib as “a sprawling compound on the desert floor 20 miles west of Bagh-
dad that has become a notorious symbol of fear among Iraqis for its history of mass
executions and allegations of torture”).
21
DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY
POLICE BRIGADE, at 16-17 (prepared by Major General Antonio M. Taguba, Investigat-
ing Officer) (May 27, 2004) [hereinafter TAGUBA REPORT], available at
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/TR3.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2004).  The
executive summary of this redacted report carries the date “5/27/04,” although an un-
redacted version was released earlier and posted at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
4894001/ (updated May 4, 2004).  For ease of page citation, this Article refers to the
officially released version.
22
TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 21, at 16.
23
Id. at 18.  Taguba acknowledged that this finding disagreed with an earlier re-
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“routinely” held unidentified captives, Taguba wrote; at least once,
these “ghost detainees” were hidden from the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross, the body charged with monitoring compliance
with the Geneva Conventions.24  In Taguba’s view, the mistreatment
violated two pertinent bodies of law; specifically, the Army’s own regu-
lations and the Third Geneva Convention.  Taguba drew a link,
moreover, between those activities and Guantánamo:  he noted that
the abuses he documented had occurred right after the visit to Abu
Ghraib of Major General Geoffrey D. Miller, commander of the Joint
Task Force at Guantánamo.  After stating that Miller’s team deemed it
“essential” that prison guards “be actively engaged in setting the con-
ditions for successful exploitation of the internees,” Taguba voiced his
own disagreement with any adoption in Iraq of techniques used at
Guantánamo.25
C.  Executive Memoranda
The Abu Ghraib photos and Taguba’s report opened a floodgate.
Leaked within weeks were Justice Department memoranda that
formed the legal backbone for the Executive’s contention that off-
shore detainees had no recourse to U.S. courts,26 plus a governmental
report that parsed international and domestic law in the course of de-
termining the legality of various methods of interrogation.27  Alberto
port, written by Major General Donald J. Ryder, Provost Marshal General of the Army.
Id.
24
Id. at 26-27.
25
Id. at 8-9 (quoting the Executive Summary prepared by Major General Miller’s
team).
26
Memorandum re:  Application of Treaties and Laws to Al Qaeda and Taliban
Detainees, from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Robert J. Dela-
hunty, Special Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of De-
fense (draft dated Jan. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Yoo/Delahunty Memorandum], available
at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5032094/site/newsweek (last visited Mar. 22,
2005); Memorandum re:  Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens Held in Guan-
tanamo Bay, Cuba, from Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and
John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to William J. Haynes, II, General
Counsel, Department of Defense (Dec. 28, 2001) [hereinafter Philbin/Yoo Memoran-
dum], available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5022681/site/newsweek (last vis-
ited Mar. 22, 2005); see also Bush Memorandum, supra note 9, at 1-2 (calling for “new
thinking in the law of war . . . consistent with the principles of Geneva,” even though
Geneva’s explicit protections were deemed not to apply on the grounds that Al Qaeda
is not a state and that Taliban detainees were “unlawful combatants”).
27
Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Ter-
rorism:  Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations (draft
dated Mar. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Working Group Report], available at http://www.
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R. Gonzales, then-Counsel to the President, was revealed to have ad-
vised Bush that “the war against terrorism is a new kind of war,” which
creates a new need for “the ability to quickly obtain information from
captured terrorists and their sponsors,” and so “renders obsolete Ge-
neva’s strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and ren-
ders quaint” other provisions in the treaty.28  Also leaked was an
August 2002 Justice Department memorandum prepared at Gonza-
les’s request.29  Based on its survey of domestic and international law,
the Justice Department maintained that “certain acts,” though they
“may be cruel, inhuman, or degrading,” still might “not produce pain
and suffering of the requisite intensity” to violate U.S. law implement-
ing the Convention Against Torture.30  Physical suffering would not
constitute torture unless it was “equivalent in intensity to the pain ac-
companying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment
of bodily function, or even death,” the memorandum stated; as for
mental suffering, there would be no torture absent “significant psy-
chological harm . . . lasting for months or even years.”31
npr.org/documents/dojmemo30020306.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).  This draft,
portions of which cribbed passages from the later-disclosed but earlier-written Memo-
randum re:  Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A,
from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto
R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee Interro-
gation Memorandum], available at http://www.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/doj/
bybee80102mem.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2005), discussed, inter alia, the following
sources of law:  U.S. CONST. amends. V, VIII, XIV; Convention Against Torture, supra
note 16; Geneva Conventions, supra note 5; customary international law and military
law; American Convention on Human Rights:  Pact of San José, Costa Rica, Nov. 22,
1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948)
[hereinafter UDHR], available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/3/ares3.htm
(last visited Mar. 22, 2005); and foreign and domestic case law.  A final version of this
Working Group Report, dated April 4, 2003, to which were attached recommendations
for use of a number of techniques later authorized for use at Guantánamo, see infra
text accompanying notes 32-34, was released by the Pentagon and is available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/040403dod.pdf (last vis-
ited Mar. 22, 2005).
28
Gonzales Memorandum, supra note 9, at 2, quoted in John Barry et al., The Roots
of Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004, at 26, 30-31.
29
See Letter from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President 1 (Aug. 1, 2002) (discussing the genesis of Bybee
Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 27), available at http://news.findlaw.com/
hdocs/docs/doj/bybee80102ltr.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
30
Bybee Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 27, at 1 (interpreting 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2340-2340A (Supp. 2003)).
31
Id. at 1.
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The leaks produced a tumult that prompted the Pentagon to
make public a sheaf of documents in the third week of June 2004.
Thus it was confirmed that late in 2002 Guantánamo interrogators
had been authorized to employ so-called “counter-resistance tech-
niques”—some of which later found their way to Abu Ghraib.32  Milder
techniques included sensory deprivation, hooding, and forced nudity;
removal of religious items; “use of stress positions (like standing), for
a maximum of four hours”; playing on “phobias (such as fear of dogs)
to induce stress”; and claiming that the interrogator came “from a
country with a reputation for harsh treatment.”  The most severe
techniques included the “use of scenarios designed to convince the
detainee that death or severely painful consequences are imminent
for him and/or his family,”  “[u]se of mild, non-injurious physical
contact,” and “[u]se of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the
misperception of suffocation.”33  Such techniques would not violate
U.S. law, an Army memorandum argued, and added “international
law analysis is not required for the current proposal because the Ge-
neva Conventions do not apply.”34  Rumsfeld agreed, and in approving
the request added a handwritten note:  “However, I stand for 8-10
hours A day.  Why is standing limited to 4 hours?”35
32
Memorandum re:  Counter-Resistance Techniques, from William J. Haynes II,
General Counsel, to Secretary of Defense (Nov. 27, 2002) [hereinafter Action Memo-
randum], available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/
dodmemos.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).  Attachments to this document included
Memorandum re:  Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies, from Lieu-
tenant Colonel Diane E. Beaver, Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army, to Commander,
Joint Task Force 170 (Oct. 11, 2002) [hereinafter Beaver Memorandum], and Memo-
randum re:  Request for Approval of Counter-Resistance Strategies, from Lieutenant
Colonel Jerald Phifer, Director, J2, U.S. Army, to Commander, Joint Task Force 170
(Oct. 11, 2002) [hereinafter Phifer Memorandum].  Allegations that they had en-
dured at Guantánamo harsh techniques that violated U.S. and international law
formed the basis of a lawsuit brought by four former detainees.  Complaint at 5-8
(filed Oct. 27, 2004), Rasul v. Rumsfeld (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 1:04CV01804), available
at http://www.nimj.com/documents/Complaint_Rasul_v._Rumsfeld.pdf (last visited
Mar. 22, 2005).
33
Phifer Memorandum, supra note 32, at 1-3.  Later the Pentagon released a chart
indicating that in the first six weeks after authorization, nearly all the techniques were
employed at Guantánamo, with the notable exceptions of physical contact and use of
dogs.  GTMO Interrogation Techniques (June 22, 2004), available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/062204GTMOslide.pdf (last visited
Mar. 22, 2005).
34
Beaver Memorandum, supra note 32, at 5.
35
Action Memorandum, supra note 32, at 1 (use of capitals as in original).
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D.  Judicial Decision
Days after the Pentagon released what some were calling “the tor-
ture memos,” the Supreme Court issued a trilogy of decisions that cast
a judicial tether around the detention policy.  Ruling in Rasul for two
Australian and twelve Kuwaiti detainees, six Justices rejected the posi-
tion of the Executive and held that U.S. courts have jurisdiction to
consider the lawfulness of protracted detention at Guantánamo.36  Jus-
tice Stevens’s opinion for five members situated such review within a
common law tradition of habeas corpus that predated the founding of
the American Republic.37  The statute Congress passed in service of
this tradition gives U.S. courts power to hear habeas petitions “by any
person who claims to be held ‘in custody in violation of the Constitu-
tion or laws or treaties of the United States,’” the Court wrote.38  The
Court further held that its own precedent imposed no such limit, par-
ticularly at Guantánamo, where, on account of a lease executed in
1903, the United States enjoyed “‘complete jurisdiction and con-
trol.’”39
Having declined to establish the procedures for reviewing deten-
tion in Rasul,40 the Court avoided making any substantive decisions in
Padilla by ruling that the habeas petition at issue had not been filed
according to proper procedures.41  But the Court’s decision in Hamdi,
the other citizen-enemy combatant case, outlined a framework within
which courts might review executive detention.
Unable in Hamdi to raise extraterritoriality as a bar to judicial
oversight, the Executive had contended that, as Commander-in-Chief,
the President enjoyed absolute prerogative to detain during time of
36
Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2699 (2004) (Stevens, J., joined by O’Connor,
Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.); id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
37
Id. at 2692 (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,
218-219 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
38
Id. at 2692, 2696 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3) (2000)).
39
Id. at 2693-99 (quoting Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb.
16-23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, T.S. No. 418).  The Court distinguished Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777-78 (1950), a case arising out of World War II, which
stated that to benefit from “the privilege of litigation,” aliens in military custody
must be present in a “territory over which the United States is sovereign.”  Rasul, 124
S. Ct. at 2693.
40
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2699.
41
See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2727 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy & Thomas, JJ.) (ordering dismissal of the habeas petition
filed in New York, but permitting petitioner to refile in South Carolina).
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war.42  The Court unanimously rebuked this position.  All nine Justices
agreed that a modicum of judicial review of the lawfulness of deten-
tion was in order; consensus splintered, however, on the nature and
scope of that review.  At one extreme, the dissent of Justices Antonin
Scalia and John Paul Stevens called upon ancient common law sources
and the text of the U.S. Constitution in support of their argument
that, unless Congress suspends the writ of habeas corpus, the only way
that the Executive may detain a U.S. citizen is “to prosecute him in
federal court for treason or some other crime.”43  At the other ex-
treme, Justice Clarence Thomas’s dissent argued that a one-sentence
congressional resolution adopted a week after September 11 gave the
President almost plenary power to decide whom to detain and under
what conditions.44  In between was the opinion of Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices
Anthony Kennedy and Stephen Breyer.  This plurality agreed that the
congressional authorization to “‘use all necessary and appropriate
force’” gave the Executive power to detain, but maintained that due
process “unquestionably” guaranteed the petitioner “the right to ac-
cess to counsel” and “a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual
basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker.”45  The plural-
ity suggested that on remand there should be a balancing of individ-
ual and governmental interests along the lines of the Court’s prescrip-
tion for review of administrative decisions, but stated that, given the
“ongoing military conflict,” the government’s interests deserved
added ballast.46  It added that “an appropriately authorized and prop-
erly constituted military tribunal” might suffice.47  The last points drew
criticism from the remaining Justices, David Souter and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg.  These two insisted that Congress had not authorized ex-
ecutive detention, and that in any event, due process likely would not
42
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2004).
43
Id. at 2660 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (relying on the Due Process Clause, U.S.
CONST. amend. V, and the Suspension Clause, id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety may require it.”)).
44
See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2679 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Authorization for
Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001) [hereinafter
AUMF], which authorizes the President “to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided” the September 11 attacks).
45
Id. at 2635, 2652 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (quoting AUMF, supra note
44, at 224).
46
Id. at 2645-50 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
47
Id. at 2651.
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condone giving excess weight to the government’s interests or allow-
ing a military tribunal to act as sole arbiter of a challenge to deten-
tion.48
E.  Aftermath
Although not all ramifications of the Court’s trilogy were clear, its
holding was:  in a democracy founded on the separation of powers,
the judicial branch is obliged, even in wartime, to discharge its role as
a coequal branch entitled to review acts of the Executive.  In the
months after Rasul, Hamdi, and Padilla issued, several federal judges
appeared determined to fulfill that duty.  “The President is not a tri-
bunal,” one judge declared as he called to an abrupt halt a detainee’s
trial before a special military commission established by presidential
order.49  Another judge ruled unconstitutional the means by which de-
tainees were being held at Guantánamo, even as her colleague ruled
that no law permitted him to reach that question.50  Rulings by an-
other judge resulted in the release of thousands of pages of docu-
ments regarding detention policy and practice.51
48
Id. at 2652-60 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring
in judgment).  The two nonetheless joined aspects of Justice O’Connor’s opinion in
order “to give practical effect to the conclusions of eight members of the Court reject-
ing the Government’s position.” Id. at 2660.
49
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 162, 165 (D.D.C.) (Robertson, J.)
(stating that detainee trials must conform to Geneva Conventions), motion to expedite
cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 680 (2004); see also Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and
Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833,
57,834 (Nov. 13, 2001) (giving the President authority to determine whether an indi-
vidual is a member of Al Qaeda and to detain the individual subject to penalties under
applicable laws).  The military commissions proposed for trial of detainees already had
faced controversy.  See, e.g., John Hendren, Guantanamo Tribunal Loses 3 Members Due to
Possible Conflicts, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2004, at A29 (describing how three officers were
removed from the tribunal panel, leaving only three remaining members); Neil A.
Lewis, Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8,
2004, at A1 (describing criticisms of hearings based on the lack of protections afforded
detainees); Neil A. Lewis, Guantánamo Tribunal Process in Turmoil, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26,
2004, § 1, at 29 (describing changes to be made to the tribunal process); see also
Amann, supra note 7, at 268-69, 329-35 (discussing the creation of the military tribunals
and the requirements that international law places on them).
50
Compare In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 481 (D.D.C.
2005) (Green, J.) (denying government’s motion to dismiss challenges to detention),
with Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 330 (D.D.C. 2005) (Leon, J.) (granting simi-
lar motion).
51
See Richard A. Serrano & Greg Miller, Documents Provide More Details on Prisoner
Abuse Allegations, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2004, at A4 (discussing documents available at
American Civil Liberties Union, Records Released in Response to Torture FOIA Request, at
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2005)).  As part of
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In response, the Executive altered some practices.  Hamdi was re-
turned to Saudi Arabia on the condition that he renounce U.S. citi-
zenship,52 amid speculation that Padilla might be returned to the or-
dinary federal criminal courts to face prosecution.53  Releases at
Guantánamo stepped up, so that the population dropped to 540.54
Detainees who remained were permitted to plead for release, albeit
under conditions that one federal judge deemed unconstitutional, be-
fore three-member Combatant Status Review Tribunals established by
the military after issuance of the Court’s detention trilogy.55  The Jus-
tice Department released a memorandum expressly disagreeing with
its memorandum of August 2002, which had limited “torture” to acts
this litigation, in February 2005 the judge rejected a bid by the CIA to withhold deten-
tion records in its possession.  ACLU v. Dep’t of Defense, 351 F. Supp. 2d 265, 278
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (Hellerstein, J.).
52
Settlement Agreement, Hamdi (No. 03-0696) (Sept. 17, 2004), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/hamdi/91704stlagrmnt.html; Joel Brinkley,
From Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia, via Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2004, at A4 (de-
scribing Hamdi’s release).
53
See generally Emma Schwartz, Terror Indictments May Be Linked to Padilla, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2004, at A16 (reporting on the indictments of two men connected to
Padilla).  Padilla had been arrested at Chicago’s O’Hare Airport and was designated an
enemy combatant only after spending a month in federal custody pursuant to a mate-
rial witness warrant issued in New York.  Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2715-16
(2004).
54
David Johnston, Judge Limits the Transfer of 13 from Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
30, 2005, at A14 (reporting that 540 persons were in custody at Guantánamo, and that
214 detained there in the antiterrorism campaign had left).  Additional releases faced
obstacles, however.  A federal judge ruled that thirteen Yemenis could not be trans-
ferred without an opportunity to seek a hearing on conditions in the destination coun-
try, and other detainees had filed similar challenges.  Id.; see also Abdah v. Bush, No.
Civ.A. 04-1254(HHK), 2005 WL 711814, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2005) (Kennedy, J.)
(ordering government to give thirty days’ notice of removal to petitioners, who as-
serted that they might be sent “to the custody of foreign nations to be further detained
and possibly tortured”).
55
The tribunals were established in July 2004.  Memorandum re:   Implementa-
tion of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants detained
at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, from Gordon England, Secretary of the Navy
(July 29, 2004) (describing the review process established by the Secretary of Defense),
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040730comb.pdf.  Six
months later, a judge found some procedures fundamentally unfair.  See In re Guan-
tanamo Detainee Cases,  355 F. Supp. 2d at 468-72 (Green, J.) (ruling that complaints
stated claim for violation of due process on account of tribunal’s reliance on classified
information and denial of assistance of counsel).  But cf. Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 329-
30 (Leon, J.) (concluding that neither domestic nor international law provided a basis
by which a federal court could review conditions of detainees captured and held out-
side U.S. borders).  In all, the status review tribunals reviewed 558 cases and deter-
mined that thirty-eight detainees “were no longer enemy combatants and could be eli-
gible for release.”  Johnston, supra note 54.
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that caused “‘excruciating and agonizing’ pain,” or “pain ‘equivalent
in intensity to pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as or-
gan failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death.’”56  Yet Ex-
ecutive officials resisted efforts to extend the President’s ban on in-
humane treatment to employees of the CIA.57  Notwithstanding these
developments, the Executive persisted in its argument that nothing
required it to submit to judicial oversight.58
Outside the judicial arena, attention paid to detention was less
consistent.  Various inquiries, including two by military investigators
and one by a special panel that Secretary Rumsfeld had appointed,
confirmed sundry abuses at various detention sites but found no pol-
icy of abuse.59  Throughout the year there were disclosures of addi-
56
Memorandum re:  Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A,
from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to James B. Comey, Deputy At-
torney General 2 (Dec. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Levin Memorandum] (quoting Bybee
Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 27, at 1, 19), available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
57
See Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, White House Fought New Curbs on Interroga-
tions, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at A1 (reporting on letter of opposition
sent to Congress by then-National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice); Eric Lichtblau,
Gonzales Says Humane-Policy Order Doesn’t Bind C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2005, at A17
(stating that, in written responses to questions related to his confirmation hearings,
Gonzales said that CIA was bound by prohibition against torture, but not against in-
humane treatment).  CIA practices at issue included concealment of detainees, harsh
interrogation measures, and transfer of captives to countries where security forces were
believed to use torture during interrogations.  See, e.g., Douglas Jehl, C.I.A. Says Ap-
proved Methods of Questioning Are All Legal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2005, at A7 (reporting
on CIA statement that its interrogation methods “are lawful and do not constitute tor-
ture”); Douglas Jehl, Rule Change Lets C.I.A. Freely Send Suspects Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
6, 2005, § 1, at 1 (writing that post-September 11 presidential directive allowed in-
crease in renditions to other countries); Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, NEW YORKER,
Feb. 14 & 21, 2005, at 106 (detailing history of CIA practice of rendering suspects);
Josh White, Army Documents Shed Light on CIA ‘Ghosting,’  WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2005, at
A15 (reporting on extent of concealment efforts).
58
See Evidence from Torture Is Usable, U.S. Asserts, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2004, at A6;
Carol D. Leonnig, Judge Questions Sweep of Bush’s War on Terrorism, WASH. POST, Dec. 2,
2004, at A4.  During confirmation hearings, Gonzales “reiterated his view that a presi-
dent could theoretically decide that a U.S. law—such as the prohibition against tor-
ture—is unconstitutional.”  Dan Eggen & Charles Babington, Torture by U.S. Personnel
Illegal, Gonzales Tells Senate, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2005, at A4.  The Justice Department
memorandum that superseded the Bybee Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 27,
sidestepped the question as “unnecessary” and “inconsistent with the President’s une-
quivocal directive that United States personnel not engage in torture.”  Levin Memo-
randum, supra note 56, at 2.
59
INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS, FINAL REPORT 5
(2004), at http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/dod/abughraibrpt.pdf [hereinafter
SCHLESINGER REPORT]; DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU
GHRAIB DETENTION FACILITY AND 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 7 (prepared
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tional instances of abuse, some fatal, and also of efforts to prevent re-
porting of abuse.60  What one FBI agent called “extreme interrogation
techniques” were revealed to have been in use as early as May 2002.61
Even after the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, there were reports that
Guantánamo detainees were enduring coercion “‘tantamount to tor-
ture,’”62 and that other detainees had been ghosted out of Iraq, in
by Lieutenant General Anthony R. Jones and Major General George R. Fay) (Aug.
23, 2004), available at http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/reports/ar15-6/ar15-6.pdf (last
visited May 3, 2005), and available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nationi/
documents/fay_report_8-25-04.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2005); Unclassified Execu-
tive Summary Regarding Department of Defense Interrogation Operations (pre-
pared by Vice Admiral Albert T. Church III, Naval Inspector General) (n.d., release
noted on March 10, 2005 by Jim Garamone, Admiral Issues Report:  ‘No Policy Condoned
Torture, Abuse,’ AM. FORCES INFO. SERVICE, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Mar2005/20050310_143.html) [hereinafter Church Executive Summary], available
at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050310exe.pdf (last visited Apr.
6, 2005).
60
See, e.g., Memorandum re:  Alleged Detainee Abuse by TF 62-6 Personnel, from
Vice Admiral L.E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, to Under-
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (June 25, 2004) (on file with author) (reporting
that DIA employees who observed prisoner abuse at Baghdad detention center were
threatened, confined to the compound, and ordered “not to talk to anyone in the
US”); see also Dan Eggen & R. Jeffrey Smith, FBI Agents Allege Abuse of Detainees at Guan-
tanamo Bay, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2004, at A1 (listing several reported incidents, in-
cluding prolonged shackling of detainees into fetal position); John Hendren, Pentagon
Confirms Detainee Deaths After Disclosure, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at A3 (disclosing the
deaths of detainees in Afghanistan); Carol D. Leonnig & Dana Priest, Detainees Accuse
Female Interrogators, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2005, at A1 (reporting that Pentagon inquiry
would credit allegations that women “used sexually suggestive tactics to try to humiliate
and pry information from devout Muslim men” at Guantánamo); Thomas E. Ricks,
Detainee Abuse by Marines Is Detailed, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2004, at A1 (describing inves-
tigation of abuse in Iraq, contained in documents released pursuant to Freedom of
Information Act request); R. Jeffrey Smith, General Cites Problems at U.S. Jails in Afghani-
stan, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2004, at A1 (noting shortcomings in military interrogation
practices and the possibility that this may have led to detainee abuse); R. Jeffrey Smith
& Dan Eggen, New Papers Suggest Detainee Abuse Was Widespread, WASH. POST, Dec. 22,
2004, at A1 (describing Army probes into multiple cases of detainee abuse); Josh
White, Detainees Abused in N. Iraq, Army Papers Suggest, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2005, at
A11 (citing allegations that detainees were tortured at U.S. Army facility).
61
Internal FBI E-mail (July 9, 2004) at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/
t3449.pdf.
62
See Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
30, 2004, at A1 (quoting confidential report by Red Cross team that visited Guan-
tánamo in June 2004).  But see Richard A. Serrano, Pentagon Denies Abuse Charges at
Guantanamo, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2004, at A21 (reporting that Pentagon officials denied
torture allegations and found “no credible instances of detainee abuse”); Press Re-
lease, International Committee of the Red Cross, The ICRC’s Work at Guantanamo
Bay (Nov. 30, 2004), available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/
678FK8 (last visited Mar. 22, 2004) (refusing to confirm or deny allegations made in
Lewis, supra).
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keeping with a legal memorandum holding that this did not violate
the Fourth Geneva Convention.63  Notwithstanding, Rumsfeld de-
flected scattered calls that he resign on account of the abuse scandal.64
Seven Abu Ghraib guards were charged; most cases were disposed of
by guilty pleas and minimal sentences.65  No senior officer had been
charged, 66 and few expected such charges to be tendered.67  President
63
See Dana Priest, Memo Lets CIA Take Detainees Out of Iraq, WASH. POST, Oct. 24,
2004, at A1 (discussing, inter alia, Draft Memorandum re:  Permissibility of Relocating
Certain “Protected Persons” from Occupied Iraq, from Jack Goldsmith, Assistant At-
torney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to William H. Taft IV, General Counsel, De-
partment of State et al. (Mar. 19, 2004) [hereinafter Goldsmith Memorandum], avail-
able at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/doj_memo031904.
pdf).
64
President Bush reportedly refused Rumsfeld’s tenders of resignation.  Rumsfeld
Twice Offered to Resign, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2005, at A18.  German authorities rejected a
private complaint brought against Rumsfeld.  Daryl Lindsey, German Prosecutor Won’t
Pursue Rumsfeld Case, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Feb. 10, 2005, at http://www.spiegel.de/
international/0,1518,341131,00.html (explaining reasons prosecutors declined to pur-
sue allegations).  See generally Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Torture in Abu Ghraib:  The Com-
plaint Against Donald Rumsfeld Under the German Code of Crime Against International Law, 6
GERMAN L.J. 689 (2005).  Weeks later, eight former detainees sued Rumsfeld in federal
court in Chicago, alleging that he was responsible for abuse they suffered while held in
Iraq and Afghanistan.  See R. Jeffrey Smith, Suit Says Rumsfeld Knew About Abuse of De-
tainees, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2005, at A15 (describing complaint in Ali v. Rumsfeld, draft
of which is available at http://humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/lawsuit/PDF/rums-
complaint-022805.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2005)).
65 Abu Ghraib Prison Guard Seeks Leniency in Sentencing, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2005, at
A29 (referring to status of other six cases, including two that remained pending); As-
sociated Press, 6 Months in Prison for Abu Ghraib Guard, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2005, at A23
(reporting on sentence levied against sergeant who had pleaded guilty to abuse
charges); Josh White, Abu Ghraib Prison MP Pleads Guilty to Reduced Charge, WASH. POST,
Nov. 3, 2004, at A12 (writing that third case ended without prison sentence, and that
longest sentence imposed before then had been eight years in prison); Kate Zernike,
Ringleader in Iraqi Prisoner Abuse Is Sentenced to 10 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2005, § 1, at
12 (reporting on sentencing of “ringleader of the abuse,” only accused person who
had, to date, taken case to trial).  Scattered cases were brought regarding other inci-
dents, including one against a civilian contractor.  See, e.g., Douglas Jehl, Pentagon Will
Not Try 17 G.I.’s Implicated in Prisoners’ Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2005, at A1 (writing
that “[t]o date, the military has taken steps toward prosecuting some three dozen sol-
diers in connection with a total of 28 confirmed or suspected homicides of detainees”
in Iraq and Afghanistan, but that it had declined to charge seventeen soldiers with re-
gard to three detainees’ deaths); Louise Roug, Soldier Faces Court-Martial in Killing of
Bound Man, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2005, at A7 (reporting on case involving shooting by
U.S. soldier); Scott Shane, C.I.A. Interrogator’s Defense to Cite Bush at Brutality Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005, at A11 (reporting on case brought in federal court in North
Carolina against former soldier “hired by the C.I.A. in 2003 to capture fighters from
the Taliban and Al Qaeda and question them”).
66
The Guantánamo general with whose recommendations about detainee treat-
ment Major General Taguba had disagreed was sent to Iraq to run U.S. military prisons
there, then given a “senior staff job” at the Pentagon.  See Associated Press, General Who
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Bush declared his reelection “an accountability moment” by which
voters endorsed his conduct of war in Iraq.68  In early 2004 the Senate
approved the appointments to higher office of aides who had helped
devise antiterrorism policies—including Gonzales, who became Attor-
ney General of the United States.69  A few members of Congress con-
tinued to express concern about detention policies; however, it
seemed unlikely that a majority would agree to legislate significant
changes.70  The once-unforgettable image of the hooded detainee
Led Prisons Is Reassigned, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2004, at A15 (reporting that the general
would become the Army’s assistant chief of staff for installation management).  The
general in charge of supervising interrogators at Abu Ghraib became the head of the
Army’s intelligence school.  See Eric Schmitt, Former Intelligence Officer Cleared in Iraq
Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2005, at A7 (quoting Vice Admiral Albert T. Church III’s
statement to reporters upon release of the Church Executive Summary, supra note 59,
that this general “really was not particularly engaged in the interrogation techniques”).
And it was reported that the general in charge of military operations in Iraq at the time
of the documented abuse might be promoted.  See John Hendren, 4-Star Plans After Abu
Ghraib, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2004, at A1 (noting that senior Pentagon officials were “de-
termined to pin a fourth star on Sanchez”).
67
The independent panel, for instance, had found no legal culpability on the part
of senior officers.  SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 59, at 5, 79-83.  But see Kate
Zernike, High-Ranking Officers May Face Prosecution in Iraqi Prisoner Abuse, Military Offi-
cials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2005, at A8 (reporting on status of various investigations
into prisoner abuse, and view of persons outside government that charges might yet be
brought).
68 Excerpts from Bush Interview, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2005, at A16.  An author of le-
gal memoranda regarding detention and interrogation echoed this statement, with
specific reference to the abuse scandal.  See Mayer, supra note 57, at 114 (quoting for-
mer Justice Department lawyer John Yoo as “suggest[ing] that President Bush’s victory
in the 2004 election, along with the relatively mild challenge to Gonzales mounted by
the Democrats in Congress, was ‘proof that the debate is over’” and that “‘[t]he public
has had its referendum’”).
69
See Eric Lichtblau, Gonzales Is Confirmed in a Closer Vote than Expected, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 4, 2005, at A13 (reporting that, despite complaints raised by a few Senators, the
Senate voted 60-36 to confirm Gonzales’s nomination); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Rice Is
Sworn in as Secretary After Senate Vote of 85 to 13, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2005, at A3 (report-
ing on elevation of Condoleezza Rice, formerly Bush’s National Security Adviser, to
position of Secretary of State); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Unanimously Confirms Chertoff
as Homeland Security Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2005, at A16 (stating that federal judge
Michael Chertoff, a top official in the Department of Justice on September 11, was ap-
proved to run the Department of Homeland Security).
70
Senators from either side of the aisle did call for “comprehensive review of our
interrogation techniques,” Lindsey Graham & Jane Harman, Clearing the Fog On Interro-
gations, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2005, at A31.  Yet most members of Congress proved re-
luctant to press the matter.  See Editorial, More Excuses, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2005, at
B6 (detailing manifestations of congressional hesitation with regard to abuse issue); see
also Tom Curry, Why Torture Issue Hasn’t Had Political Traction, MSNBC.COM, Feb. 15,
2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6970081/ (positing reasons for Congress’s hesi-
tation).
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seemed destined soon to slip into the recesses of America’s collective
conscience.71
II. RAISING CONFLICTS CONSCIOUSNESS
What happened at Abu Ghraib, and Bagram, and Guantánamo,
was wrong.  The evil of the abuse is apparent even to the six-year-old
who spots a tattered poster of the hooded detainee. Policymakers
dared not complain of the breaches of confidentiality that led to pub-
lication of certain documents; they knew that the evil of the abuses de-
tailed in those documents precluded any such complaint.  Most of
those who committed abuse likewise must have known that their con-
duct was wrong.  Yet reports indicated that detainee abuse began just
months after September 11, and recurred throughout the first years of
what the U.S. military came to call GWOT, or Global War on Terror.
Detainee abuse was, to quote the investigative panel appointed by
Rumsfeld, “entirely predictable,” a failure of planning and training.72
It was, as well, a failure of law.
“Law” includes “hard” law—positive enactments clearly subject to
domestic enforcement.  It also encompasses “soft” law—the moral and
ethical values that undergird such enactments, and also external norm
systems and legal regimes whose internal enforceability is in dispute.
From the outset, the Executive’s detention policy provoked questions
regarding law thus understood:  Which applied?  Which was to be fol-
lowed?  Might a body of law be ignored?  How were applicable con-
straints to be enforced?  Different actors sought answers in different
sources.  Many in the United States looked only to U.S. law.  Interna-
tional law was a preferred source for foreign actors, such as a British
judge asked to rule on the validity of U.S. detention at Guantánamo,73
and for transnational actors, such as the Red Cross and other human
rights organizations.74  In some instances an actor seemed to have
71
In truth, oblivion had set in much earlier.  The Democratic presidential candi-
date said little about detention, even at Abu Ghraib, a fact that one postelection com-
mentator attributed to lack of public concern.  See Katha Pollitt, Mourn, NATION, Nov.
22, 2004, at 10 (noting absence of markers of outrage; that is, “the demonstrations, the
sit-ins, the teach-ins, the lying down in traffic . . . to force the Bush Administration to
account for this outrageous crime against humanity”).
72
SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 59, app. G, at 1; see also TAGUBA REPORT, supra
note 21, at 10, 19-20, 34 (also citing poor training).
73
See The Queen (Abbasi & Another) v. Sec’y of State for Foreign and Common-
wealth Affairs, 2002 Q.B. 1598, ¶¶ 63-64 (Eng. C.A. 2002), available at http://www.
bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2002/1598.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
74
See Red Cross, Overview, supra note 12 (noting that the ICRC asked U.S. authori-
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gravitated to one body of law without full consideration of the poten-
tial relevance of others.  Disclosures in the wake of the Abu Ghraib
scandal underscored confusion—confusion that well may have
thwarted prevention and punishment of abuse—about the existence
and interrelation of various sources of law.  Law failed to the extent
that existing systems did not enable key actors to see, to comprehend,
and to accommodate these sources of constraint.
The field of conflict of laws would seem to have offered a means
to avoid such failure.  Conflicts rests on an essential premise:  in many
instances more than one law, and quite often more than one legal fo-
rum, pertain.  Laws bump into, vie with, and lay over one another.
Landmark U.S. conflicts opinions arose out of civil suits that invoked
tort, contract, or property law to resolve disagreement between private
individuals, human or corporate.75  The relevance of multiple legal re-
gimes was taken as a given; the cases focused on resolving conflict as a
necessary step to ending the dispute.  This sharing of premises, pro-
cedures, and goals has parallels in the quotidian compromise of the
private sphere.  There, law is not a static thing of nature.  It is, rather,
but one component of each day’s dynamics.  Business practice may
shape law as much as law shapes practice, and law that resists reshap-
ing is as likely to be ignored as obeyed.  When governmental mecha-
nisms do not suit, individuals increasingly are wont to turn to private
arbitration systems, which resolve settlements according to internal
agreement rather than external norms.  Amid such volatility, both
conflicts’ premise of competing laws and its processes for resolving
competition operate with relative ease.  Conflicts is devoted to recon-
ciling this competition, by application of certain methodologies to
doctrines of choice of law, jurisdiction, and judgment recognition.76
Its insights thus might have aided in the determination of laws govern-
ing executive detention; nonetheless, those who made, reviewed, and
ties to treat Guantánamo detainees in accordance with international humanitarian
law); Press Release, Human Rights Watch, U.S.:  Geneva Conventions Apply to Guan-
tanamo Detainees (Jan. 11, 2002) (urging the United States to abide by requirements
of Geneva framework at Guantánamo), available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/
2002/01/11/usdom3461.htm (last visited Dec. 9, 2004).
75
See, e.g., Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 213 (1933) (reversing order
sustaining daughter’s request that father pay child support); Linn v. Employers Rein-
surance Corp., 139 A.2d 638, 640 (Pa. 1958) (resolving conflicts question in contract
action brought by insurance brokers against insurance company).
76
Such topics are the foci of leading U.S. casebooks in the field, including LEA
BRILMAYER & JACK GOLDSMITH, CONFLICT OF LAWS:  CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed.
2002) and SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: AMERICAN,
COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL (2d ed. 2003).
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implemented detention policy seldom consulted conflicts doctrine.
That fact points to deficiencies in the field of conflict of laws, and also
in public international law, the field to which conflicts tends to dele-
gate international disputes.
A.  Law and Conflict in the United States
Executive detention has a decidedly transnational character.  Con-
finement began in the course of multilateral military action prompted
by the cross-border attacks that killed nearly 3,000 persons, citizens of
nearly forty countries, on September 11.77  Persons captured in coun-
terattacks were held in U.S. custody, but nearly all remained outside
U.S. territory.  Detainees were caught in and hailed from dozens of
countries.78  Their governments lobbied through diplomatic channels
for fair treatment and final release, even as nongovernmental organi-
zations made similar and far more public demands.  Revelations that
detainees at Abu Ghraib had endured treatment that was anything but
fair touched off a new round of outrage across the globe.  Debate
about detention policy and practice thus may be seen as a transna-
tional dispute, respecting public, not private, law.
Like private laws, public laws also rub up against each other.  Yet
public-sphere friction, particularly in cases with transnational attrib-
utes, tends to be addressed without recourse to conflict of laws.79  This
absence of conflicts analysis may be due in part to phenomena that
pervade public law in the United States but are largely lacking in pri-
vate law; that is, to hierarchical entrenchments of national law seen as
natural law.
77
See September 11, 2001 Victims, Victims by Country and Citizenship, at http://
www.september11victims.com/september11victims/COUNTRY_CITIZENSHIP.htm
(last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
78
See Amann, supra note 7, at 267 n.7 (citing report that nearly a third of Guan-
tánamo detainees “were seized not in Afghanistan but rather in Europe or Africa”);
Megan K. Stack, Case Allegedly Shows U.S. Practice of Secret Arrests, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 30,
2005, at A1 (reporting allegations that Yemeni businessman was abducted in Cairo,
then transferred, first to Bagram and eventually to Guantánamo).
79
See generally BRILMAYER & GOLDSMITH, supra note 76; SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra
note 76.
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1.  National Law as Natural Law
Law signifies a body of norms that demarks a range of permissible
behavior and allows sanctions for deviation from that range.  In the
United States, law’s rule—the rule of law—draws strength from even-
handed and predictable enforcement of standards that enjoy broad
societal consensus.  To assure ready recognition and so to encourage
continued consensus, law fixes positive labels on deviation and on de-
viants.  The taking of, say, a bicycle is not some vague wrong, but
rather the “crime” of “theft”; the taker, not just a wrongdoer, but a
“thief,” someone who society agrees deserves a preordained punish-
ment.  Labels are seen to adjust gradually, via the deliberative proc-
esses that the political branches, which are accountable to voters, and
the judiciary, which follows a tradition of stare decisis, prefer.  Each
increment of change appears to occur well within a margin of choices
about which reasonable minds may differ.  This evolutionary pace fos-
ters treatment of law as a set of consensus-driven commands, the pre-
cepts of which brook neither dissent nor disobedience.  Seen to fall
within an accepted, stable, and neutral framework, law, even positive
law, thus comes to be perceived as natural.
Legal thinkers long have challenged this perception.  In 1881,
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. warned against “supposing, because an
idea seems very familiar and natural to us, that it has always been so.
Many things which we take for granted have had to be laboriously
fought out or thought out in past times.”80  Exploration of how law
came to be made was central to the legal realism and critical legal
studies movements that emerged in Holmes’s wake.81  Today, theorists
probe not just isolated statutes or decisions, but rather the founda-
80
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 2 (1881).  Just before this
passage, Holmes famously declared:
The life of the law has not been logic:  it has been experience.  The felt neces-
sities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of pub-
lic policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with
their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in de-
termining the rules by which men should be governed.
Id. at 1.
81
See Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 50-51, 64-65 (Martin P. Golding & William A.
Edmundson eds., 2005) (explaining the development of legal theory from Holmes
to the Realist school and the Critical Legal Studies movement); Michael C. Dorf, Le-
gal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 950 (2003) (finding
roots of debate about courts’ role in “divin[ing] the true meaning of ambiguous le-
gal texts” in the Civil War era and in the work of Holmes, legal realists, and critical
theorists).
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tional premises of a complex of laws.  A salient example concerns race
or other group status.  A half-century ago scientists had rejected the
notion that genetic heritage determines race, stating that “for all prac-
tical social purposes ‘race’ is not so much a biological phenomenon as
a social myth.”82  Scholars later deployed this social construction in-
sight to attack the presumed neutrality of laws that treated persons
differently on account of race.83  At the same moment, international
judges, faced with positive laws that withheld protection unless a per-
son possessed a specific “national, ethnical, racial or religious” iden-
tity, interpreted those same laws inclusively, to encompass a great
many victims of massacres in Rwanda and wars in the Balkans.84  Skep-
tical inquiry into law’s basis now spans the ideological spectrum,85 and
82
UNESCO Statement by Experts on Race Problems, ¶ 14 (July 18, 1950), reprinted in
ASHLEY MONTAGU, STATEMENT ON RACE 15-16 (1951) (explaining that its description
of social construction theory resulted from consultation among anthropologists, soci-
ologists, geneticists, biologists, psychologists, and economists); see also CLAUDE LÉVI-
STRAUSS, RACE AND HISTORY (1958) (U.N. Economic, Social, and Cultural Organiza-
tion pamphlet in which noted social scientist posits social basis of race).  The view still
holds among most scientists.  See, e.g., STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN
391-412 (2d ed. 1981) (debunking myths of racial homogeneity).
83
See IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW:  THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 1-3
(1996) (examining early twentieth-century cases that sought to define “who was white
enough to naturalize as a citizen”); see also MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL
FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES:  FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1980S, at 64-86 (1986)
(explaining the “racialization” of American society as an “ideological process, an his-
torically specific one”).
84
See Diane Marie Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, 2 INT’L
CRIM. L. REV. 93, 102-13, 131-42 (2002) (analyzing judgments of the International
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda that construed the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
art. II, 78 U.N.T.S. 277).  See generally Diane Marie Amann, Under Deconstruction:  Inter-
national Law in a Postmodern World, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 369, 369-72 (2000) (discussing ap-
plication of Genocide Convention, as well as the Yugoslavia tribunal’s treatment of the
victim-nationality requirement of the Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 5, art.
4(1)).
85
See generally THE POLITICS OF LAW:  A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed.,
rev. ed. 1990) (collecting essays analyzing the place of law within other sectors of soci-
ety); Dorf, supra note 81, at 950 (noting that movements identifying “a form of politics”
in judicial interpretation include “even, ironically, contemporary forms of ‘textualism,’
which begin with the public choice theorist’s assumption that legislative enactments
have no deeper meaning beyond the compromise among interest groups and end in a
narrow formalism of their own”).  A symposium, The Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 1
(2001), provided commentary spurred by argument in Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation
Running Riot, 1 REGULATION 83, 84 (1995), that the New Deal had “banished . . . the
Constitution of liberty.”  By 2004 that concept had surfaced in the mass media.  Adam
Cohen, What’s New in the Legal World?  A Growing Campaign to Undo the New Deal, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at A32 (evaluating the concept in relation to Supreme Court’s
Commerce Clause doctrines).
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extends beyond questions of status to expose as constructs a host of
legal frameworks and institutions often treated as natural.86  Even the
nation-state, the superstructure within which much law operates, en-
dures examination suffused with what the late sociologist Pierre
Bourdieu called “doute radical,” or “deep-seated doubt.”87
In contrast with academia, practical political discourse seldom
considers the artifice by which law is produced.  Actors within the
government’s three branches prefer to act according to law that has
been codified by positive enactment and thus appears to be the prod-
uct of consensus.  Seldom in this arena is the veneer of naturalness
stripped from law’s frame.  What exceptions there are tend to pertain,
as might be expected in America, to questions of race.  To cite one
example:  for decades U.S. actors acceded to measures taken in pur-
suit of what the Executive had labeled a “war on drugs.”  Yet some
gave pause upon learning that defendants caught with crack co-
caine—drug of choice among poor and black persons—suffered pun-
ishments a hundred times harsher than those of defendants caught
with powder cocaine—drug of choice for the rich and white.88  The
86
See David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283,
1303, 1306 (1995) (analyzing discrepancies in drug-case sentencing by highlighting
“[d]octrinal acuity”; that is, “[w]hat the [l]aw [s]ees” and  “[w]hat the [l]aw [m]isses”).
87
PIERRE BOURDIEU, Esprits d’État. Genèse et structure du champ bureaucratique, in
RAISONS PRATIQUES:  SUR LA THÉORIE DE L’ACTION 99, 104 (1994); see also id. at 102
(“One can never harbor too much doubt in matters concerning the State.”); id. at 115-
16 (arguing that “very perverse forms of imperialism and of an internationalist nation-
alism” lay hidden beneath France’s claims to a “universal” culture (translation by
author)).  Bourdieu’s argument corresponds with constructivist theories of interna-
tional law.  See Diane Marie Amann, The International Criminal Court and the Sovereign
State, in GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 185, 201-04 (Ige F. Dekker
& Wouter G. Werner eds., 2004) (citing, for example, Phillip A. Karber, “Constructiv-
ism” as a Method in International Law, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 189 (2000); Alexan-
der Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of It:  The Social Construction of Power Politics, 46
INT’L ORG. 391 (1992)).
88
See, e.g., Double Standard on Cocaine, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 23, 2002, § 1, at 16 (calling
for reduction of 100-to-1 sentencing disparity, and stating that Congress had resisted
alteration, even though the ratio “has been a target of criticism from drug reform activ-
ists, civil rights groups, and even presidents”); Robert L. Jackson, Panel Urges More Parity
in Cocaine Sentences, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1997, at A9 (reporting on recommendation of
U.S. Sentencing Commission to bring penalties for crack and powdered cocaine “more
in line”); Bill Rankin, Drug Sentences:  AMA Criticizes Cocaine, Crack Inequity, ATLANTA J.
& CONST., Nov. 20, 1996, at A1 (reporting on medical journal’s criticism of crack sen-
tencing as “excessive” as compared to powder cocaine sentences); William Raspberry,
Crack:  The Alligator in the Swamp, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1997, at A23 (arguing that dis-
crepancy was not “racist,” while stressing that “users and sellers of ‘crack’—overwhelm-
ingly black—are far more likely to go to prison and serve longer (mandatory) terms
than are users and sellers of cocaine in its powder form—a group far likelier to com-
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politics underlying this law became sufficiently visible that for a num-
ber of years in the 1990s questions persisted regarding the law’s neu-
trality.  Even this sustained unmasking did not prompt executive,
legislative, or judicial change, however;89 that fact illustrates the de-
gree to which law enjoys acceptance for the simple reason that it is
the law.
2.  Hierarchical Entrenchments
Traditional structures of public law disputes reinforce acceptance
of U.S. law as law.  In the private lawsuit each party is an individual, a
private actor.  In a particular private case, it is true, one side may have
more economic power; however, in no case is either party a part of the
government in whose courtroom the dispute is to be decided.  Public
law litigation, in contrast, is always lopsided, setting an individual
David against a governmental Goliath.  The court is a part of the lat-
ter; the private litigant cannot evade state jurisdiction by resort to pri-
vate dispute settlement.  The government, moreover, invariably wields
more power than its private opponent, power that extends to freedom
to use force when a private individual may not.  And yet the power dif-
ferential may not give solace to the sovereign.  A public law dispute in-
vites conflict between branches of government and so injects an un-
welcome dynamic into the stasis on which the sovereign’s authority
rests.  Disputes that implicate laws, norms, or regimes external to the
United States are even less welcome.  With regard to all public law
disputes, the sovereign looks to bolster the status quo by use of hierar-
chy; that is, by enforcement of a legal caste system through doctrines,
such as federal preemption and constitutional supremacy, that render
improper the accommodation of superior to inferior law.90  In trans-
national cases, the sovereign likely will seek to buttress this hierarchy
by resort to public international law.
prise whites”).  For an account of the developments that led to this 100-to-1 ratio, as
well as a harsh critique of judgments that declined to apply stringent equal protection
analysis, see Sklansky, supra note 86.
89
See Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 516 (1998) (affirming convictions in
drug case without addressing constitutional challenges to crack sentencing scheme);
James D. Zirin, One-Size-Fits-All Sentences in a Judicial Muddle, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2004,
at M5 (referring to continued existence of crack-versus-powder sentencing discrep-
ancy).
90
See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 429 (2003) (applying pre-
emption doctrine to invalidate state statute that required disclosures by insurance
companies that had conducted business in Europe during Holocaust).
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Descendant of what was called the “law of nations,” public interna-
tional law traditionally has been the domain of sovereign nation-states.
It is thus not surprising that this brand of public law privileges the
state.  Like its domestic complement, public international law assigns
hierarchical rank to its various sources.  Preference is given to laws de-
rived from treaties and from customs arising out of general practices
that states have undertaken pursuant to legal duty.91  At times a single
source is declared lex specialis, law that controls to the exclusion of all
others; thus is international humanitarian law said to govern during
armed conflict.92  Choices among potentially applicable laws are con-
sidered questions of comity, and not, as in private conflicts cases, mat-
ters of obligation.93  Public international law does admit the possibility
91
See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 59
Stat. 1055, 1060 (setting forth as first sources of law to be applied by World Court “in-
ternational conventions . . . establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting
states” and “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”);
accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102 (1987) (defining “rule of international law” as “one that has been accepted as
such by the international community of states,” and listing the first two sources of in-
ternational law as customary international law, which “results from a general and con-
sistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation,” and “inter-
national agreement”).
92
The International Court of Justice recently reinforced this view in Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 240, para. 25 (July 8), and an
article by a Red Cross legal adviser reaffirmed that international humanitarian law is lex
specialis “in times of armed conflict.”  Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International Hu-
manitarian Law:  Challenges from the “War on Terror”, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 55, 55
n.1 (2003) (rejecting, however, view that this body of law “displaces legal regimes that
apply in peacetime”).  Others have questioned this position.  See Coard v. United
States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1283, OEA/ser. L/V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. (1999)
(applying American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Official Rec.,
OEA/Ser. L./V./II.23, doc. 21 rev. 6 (1948) [hereinafter American Declaration of
Rights], reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 665 (Ian Brownlie & Guy S.
Goodwin-Gill eds., 4th ed. 2002), to case involving detention during armed conflict,
and furthermore interpreting terms of that declaration by reference to international
humanitarian law); Karima Bennoune, Toward a Human Rights Approach to Armed Con-
flict:  Iraq 2003, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 171, 196, 209, 225-27 (2004) (calling
for rethinking of lex specialis rule so as not to exclude consideration of international
human rights law during armed conflict); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere:
Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA.
L. REV. 675, 680 (2004) (criticizing “rigid and traditional reading of the law of armed
conflict when it comes to the war on terror”).
93
See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States:  The Constitu-
tional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 259 (1992).  It bears noting
that U.S. conflict of laws also was based on comity—in Professor Riles’s words, a “quasi-
legal, quasi-diplomatic, quasi-policy-oriented concept”—until that theory was displaced
by one of vested rights at the end of the nineteenth century.  Annelise Riles, Taking on
Technology:  A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law 127 & n.68 (unpublished
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of supranational norms, enforceable against a recalcitrant state by a
body other than the state; however, it conditions enforcement of such
norms on the state’s prior consent.94  It also tolerates the use of buff-
ers, such as reservation and nonself-execution, by which a nation-state
assumes an international obligation yet precludes its own judges from
giving internal effect to that obligation.95  Public international law de-
pends on states for its enforcement; little can be done should national
courts choose not to enforce its dictates.
manuscript) (discussing rejection in 1 JOSEPH BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 3 (1935), of comity theory in JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC § 35, at 34 (1834)), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=558605 (last visited May 2, 2005).
94
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 34-38, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 331 (providing that a state is not bound without its consent).  An excep-
tion to this principle may be found in the nonconsensual jurisdiction provision that is
at the heart of U.S. opposition to the International Criminal Court.  See Amann, supra
note 87, at 189-90 (discussing debate surrounding ICC Statute, supra note 27, art.
12(2)).
95
On attachment of reservations when a treaty is ratified, see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (1987); Wil-
liam A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights:  Is the United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 277, 280-82 (1995).  The
U.S. doctrine that deems certain treaty provisions nonself-executing—unenforceable
without implementing legislation—derives from Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253,
314 (1829).  Chief Justice John Marshall wrote in Foster that a treaty provision applies
directly “whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision,” but
that “when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty ad-
dresses itself to the political, not the judicial, department; and the Legislature must
execute the contract before it can become a rule for the court.”  See also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (1987) (creat-
ing exception for “non-self executing” agreement).  Both techniques appeared in U.S.
Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 138 CONG. REC. S4781-84 (1992); one declaration in that list of conditions states
that no ICCPR right is self-executing in U.S. courts.
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B.  Legal Pluralism as Vision of Conflict
Other ways of seeing law call into question uncritical acceptance
of any one set of constraints as either natural or superior.  Scholars
such as Harold Koh and Marc Galanter have challenged the very
premise that disputes are primarily legal matters to be settled in legal
fora.96  To the contrary, disputes may be processed at nonlegal sites, by
actors with no legal training, and by methods that bear little resem-
blance to the application of legal doctrine.97  Linkage between these
nonlegal mechanisms and official fora may occur, or they may not.
Even within a legal system, nonlegal, or less legal, mechanisms may
overlay and, on occasion, control resolution of a dispute.  Galanter,
for instance, pointed to a onetime system on the Indian subcontinent
in which rulers had power to supervise all tribunals, yet did not sys-
tematically impose a general law; thus local custom and usage often
were permitted to prevail.98  The plural play of custom and state-
prescribed law within colonial and postcolonial societies likewise has
been the subject of much study.99  Some constitutions look to preserve
such interplay within the states they constitute.100
Notable for its blending of law is Europe.  Nation-states have been
engaged in a decades-long project of integration—at first of economic
96
See Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms:  Courts, Private Ordering and Indigenous
Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 1 (1981) (labeling this assumption “legal centralism”);
Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 194-99 (1996)
(discussing instances in which question of U.S. compliance with international agree-
ments was settled outside of judicial proceedings).
97
See Galanter, supra note 96, at 2; Koh, supra note 96, at 199.
98
See Galanter, supra note 96, at 28-29.
99
See, e.g., Mattias Ahrén, Indigenous Peoples’ Culture, Customs, and Traditions and
Customary Law—The Saami People’s Perspective, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 63, 64 (2004)
(arguing, with regard to customary law and statutory law, that neither type of law ought
to be subordinate to the other); Laurence Juma, Reconciling African Customary Law and
Human Rights in Kenya:  Making a Case for Institutional Reformation and Revitalization of
Customary Adjudication Processes, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 459, 477-88 (2002) (asserting
the relevance of customary African law to modern nation-building); Sally Engle Merry,
From Law and Colonialism to Law and Globalization, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 569 (2003)
(reviewing Martin Chanock, LAW, CUSTOM, AND SOCIAL ORDER:  THE COLONIAL
EXPERIENCE IN MALAWI AND ZAMBIA (Heinemann 1998)); A.A. Oba, Islamic Law As Cus-
tomary Law:  The Changing Perspective in Nigeria, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 817 (2002) (as-
sessing the present status of Islamic law in Nigeria); Robert Terris & Vera Inoue-Terris,
A Case Study of Third World Jurisprudence—Palestine:  Conflict Resolution and Customary Law
in a Neopatrimonial Society, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 462, 483-92 (2002) (describing the
role of informal conflict resolution in Palestinian culture).
100
See, e.g., AFG. CONST., art. 131 (requiring courts to apply Shia law in personal
matters involving followers of Shia sect); S. AFR. CONST., ch. 12 (providing place for
customary law and traditional leadership within constitutional structure).
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affairs alone, but more recently of a host of social and political mat-
ters—that has remapped the continent.  This is certainly true as a mat-
ter of geography:  “Europe” now reaches east as well as west, south as
well as north, to comprehend states as diverse as Poland and Portugal,
Austria and Azerbaijan.101  It is also true as a matter of politics:  nation-
states remain, yet at times yield to other spheres of influence, which
operate at transnational, international, and supranational levels.
European jurists grapple in theory and in practice with the challenges
that integration places on once-discrete municipal laws.  In 1997, ex-
perts invoked the jus commune of the Holy Roman Empire as they
blended civil and common law traditions in drafting a penal law to be
enforced by a mix of national and regional actors against anyone sus-
pected of economic crime against the European Union.102  Since that
time, a group based in Paris has explored the establishment of un droit
commun, a shared and pluralist law that would recognize, respect, and
incorporate conflicting legal systems and regimes.103  Leaders have
signed a constitution that is now open for ratification throughout the
European Union.104  Even in euroskeptic Britain, legislation, judg-
ments, and academic writings acknowledge integration as a reality.105
101
See The Council of Europe’s Member States, Council of Eur. (Oct. 2004), at http://
www.coe.int/T/E/Com/About_Coe/Member_states/default.asp (last visited Mar. 22,
2005) (listing forty-six member states of the Council of Europe, an intergovernmental
organization established after World War II through which Europe’s human rights sys-
tem operates).  Though smaller, the newly enlarged European Union spans twenty-five
states, from Iceland to Cyprus, Spain to Slovakia.  The European Union at a Glance, at
http://europa.eu.int/abc/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
102
CORPUS JURIS (Mireille Delmas-Marty ed., 1997); see also Diane Marie Amann,
Harmonic Convergence?  Constitutional Criminal Procedure in an International Context, 75
IND. L.J. 809, 836 (2000) (discussing Corpus Juris project).
103
See, e.g., 7 CRIMINALITÉ ÉCONOMIQUE ET ATTEINTES À LA DIGNITÉ DE LA
PERSONNE (Mireille Delmas-Marty ed., 2001) (seventh volume in a series entitled
“Processes of Internationalization”); VARIATIONS AUTOUR D’UN DROIT COMMUN
(Mireille Delmas-Marty et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter VARIATIONS] (compiling articles
on matters ranging from the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals to the
operation of the global marketplace, presented at first symposium of Unité Mixte de
Recherche de droit comparé de Paris, an interdisciplinary research unit).  Among the
leaders of this effort is Professor Mireille Delmas-Marty of the Collège de France,
whose works include LE RELATIF ET L’UNIVERSEL (2004) and POUR UN DROIT COMMUN
(1994), translated in TOWARDS A TRULY COMMON LAW:  EUROPE AS A LABORATORY FOR
LEGAL PLURALISM (Naomi Norberg trans., 2002).
104
See Maria De Cristofaro & Tracy Wilkinson, Nations of EU Sign Its First Constitu-
tion, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2004, at A3 (reporting on the new European Union Constitu-
tion); see also Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, July 18, 2003, O.J. (C
169) 1, available at http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf
(last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
105
See, e.g., A(FC) v. Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t, [2004] UKHL 56 (ruling that
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Law in Europe thus may be depicted as a map on which ever-less-
distinct national boundaries are layered over by multiple norm sys-
tems.106  Seeing the legal terrain thus, decisionmakers work to resolve
conflict among legal regimes.
1.  Conflict Within Conflicts
Conflict of laws seems an apt site for the study of legal pluralism
within the United States.  By its very name conflicts calls into question
undue deference to any law.  Naming legal realism among its forepar-
ents, it endeavors to reconcile clashes between competing legal re-
gimes.107  The give-and-take by which it resolves this interplay—no less
than its expectation that more than one law will obtain—necessarily
undercuts any claim that law is inevitable or natural.  The field thus
would seem a boon to challengers in public law disputes, and particu-
larly in challenges to public laws whose effects exceed national fron-
tiers.  Nonetheless, conflicts of laws has played little role in such mat-
ters.  Early rules derived from a doctrine of vested rights, one that
preferred territory as a determinant of choice of law.108  Interest analy-
indefinite detention without charge would violate European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention], part of na-
tional law by dint of Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.)), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldjudgmt/jd041216/a&others.
pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2005); Jones v. The Ministry of Interior Saudi Arabia, [2004]
EWCA (Civ) 1394 (permitting lawsuit alleging systematic torture, filed in English court
by British and Canadian complainants, to go forward against Saudi Arabia, in part on
ground that contrary ruling would undermine same convention); Andrew Evans, UK
Devolution and EU Law, 28 EUR. L. REV. 475, 487 (2003) (discussing the overlapping
roles of the United Kingdom’s Parliament and the European Union’s Ministries);
Chris Hilson, What’s in a Right? The Relationship Between Community, Fundamental and
Citizenship Rights in EU Law, 29 EUR. L. REV. 636, 636 (2004) (analyzing the promotion
of local community rights to fundamental rights in the European Union).
106
To similar effect, this author wrote in a French-language article that in Europe:
[O]ne has the vision of a postcolonial map encumbered by national spheres.
The borders used to shift but now are stable.  Today other spheres—transna-
tional, international and supranational—compete to win a place.  To establish
a supranational European identity, for example, a European space must be
cut out of a map that is already full.  One envisions the creation of a space
where no space exists.
Diane Marie Amann, Dialogue entre chercheurs de différentes traditions juridiques:  Une
perspective américaine, in VARIATIONS, supra note 103, at 367.
107
 See Riles, supra note 93, at 111-12, 128-31.
108
See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law:  New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883,
890-91 (2002) (citing BEALE, supra note 93, and RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934), for which Beale was the reporter); Riles, supra note 93, at
127-28 (same); Kermit Roosevelt III, Guantanamo and the Conflict of Laws:  Rasul and
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sis later challenged, but did not fully supplant, the territorial prefer-
ence.109  Furthermore, in its classic form the field has tended to defer
to state-based rules; as Professor Kermit Roosevelt III put it, “Conflicts
analysis is conventionally understood as a means of deciding which of
a number of different sovereigns has authority to regulate a transac-
tion.”110  Transnational conflict between a state and a private individ-
ual had little place in this scheme.
That said, there is conflict within conflicts.  Professor Annelise
Riles has written of “a sense among Conflicts scholars that the poten-
tially rich questions raised by Conflicts cases—questions of cultural
relativism, of individual rights, of the limits of state power or the char-
acter of justice, for example—have been reduced to arid technicali-
ties.”111  This, she stressed, need not be so.  Choice-of-law principles
may help determine damages for victims of international human
rights violations; jurisdictional principles may help decide where a
person suspected of cross-border crime will face trial.112  What Profes-
sor Mathias Reimann has called the “transboundary dimensions” of
cyberspace may alter state-centered understandings of conflict of
laws.113  In Riles’s words, there may be a way for “humanistic legal
scholars” to take into account “the agency of the technocratic legal
form.”114  Charting an accurate map of law in the United States is a
step toward this goal.
Beyond, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2017, 2030-41, 2044-46 (discussing conflicts’ traditional terri-
torial preference).
109
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971) (setting forth
seven interest-analysis factors “relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law” ab-
sent “statutory directive”); Guzman, supra note 108, at 891-94; Riles, supra note 93, at
128-32; Roosevelt, supra note 108, at 2062-63.
110
Roosevelt, supra note 108, at 2059 (examining detainees’ rights from interest-
analysis perspective).
111
Riles, supra note 93, at 115.
112
See BRILMAYER & GOLDSMITH, supra note 76, 765-806 (including as principal
conflicts cases, inter alia, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 864-65 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (analyzing which country’s damages laws govern in suit under Alien Tort Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2002)); United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 899-903 (D.D.C.
1988) (citing public international law on jurisdiction to prescribe denial of motion to
dismiss brought by non-American defendant seized outside United States to stand trial
for offense occurring outside United States)).
113
Mathias Reimann, Introduction:  The Yahoo! Case and Conflict of Laws in the Cyber-
age, 24 MICH J. INT’L L. 663, 666 (2003).  But cf. Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanar-
chy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1200 (1998) (challenging view that nation-states cannot
regulate cyberspace).
114
Riles, supra note 93, at 120; see also Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to
Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485 (2005) (calling for a rhetoric of
“jurispersuasion” by which assertion of jurisdiction, decoupled from enforcement, be-
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2.  Seeing Law in the United States
Acknowledgment that a legal landscape is a complex terrain, a
field on which competing sources of law do battle, carries with it cer-
tain needs.  There comes an immediate need to find ways to think and
talk about now-seen complexity; a need for means to resolve compet-
ing claims of legal authority soon follows.  In Europe complexity is a
given, with regard to public as well as private laws, and surely with re-
gard to the interaction of national with extranational regimes.  In
turn, recognition of complexity has made way for an analytical vo-
cabulary, rife with terms like “harmonization” and “hybridization,”
that is familiar to the conflicts scholar.  This is not the case in the
United States.  Disputes that in Europe would be seen at once to im-
plicate extranational norms and regimes tend to be treated as wholly
domestic, resolvable by resort to legal hierarchy.  Judges, and govern-
ment lawyers, are products of an academy that posits the national law
as “law.”  Those few who studied public international law learned the
buffer doctrines that, as Professor Thomas Franck put it, “have made
Swiss cheese of the notion that international law is part of the law of
the United States.”115  To employ the language of social construction
theories, the margin of choices about which reasonable minds may
differ has been fashioned narrowly to give recognition only to na-
tional laws; that is, to the laws that seem to come naturally.  Excep-
tionalism, pervasive in U.S. legal-political culture, reinforces this
notion.  These considerations foster a tendency not to see—more
precisely, not to see a need to see—other norms and regimes.  Con-
flict among external and internal sources of law is obscured, as is any
need for resort to methods of resolving conflict.
Clear vision reveals, however, that the United States also operates
in a crowded legal landscape.  Dominant, of course, is national law,
itself an intricate arrangement of federal and state statutes and case
law, executive decrees, and administrative regulations.  But it is not
the only law that belongs on the map.  Room must made for the legal
promises the United States has made at the international level; that is,
U.S. endorsements of a host of aspirational statements, among them
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as obligations un-
dertaken in innumerable bilateral and multilateral treaties and
comes “simply a mechanism that opens space for articulation of a norm”).
115
Thomas M. Franck, Dr. Pangloss Meets the Grinch:  A Pessimistic Comment on Harold
Koh’s Optimism, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 683, 688 (1998); see also supra note 95 and accompa-
nying text.
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agreements, on matters ranging from transfer of fugitives to regula-
tion of trade.116  Indeed the Constitution deems treaties part of na-
tional law, and a legal tradition now under attack accords similar
status to customary international law.117  International agreements
seek to promote compliance by means that range from the simple
submission of reports to a monitoring committee to the far more
complex arbitration before an international body.118  The activities of
any such panel have the potential to challenge and even, in some
cases, to compel changes in internal laws; accordingly, an accurate
map of the United States’s legal landscape would depict these en-
forcement mechanisms.  Also pertinent is the United States’s avowed
desire to influence the global arena—an arena in which its policies, its
officials, and even its private citizens loom omnipresent.  Execution of
that desire requires interdependent behavior:  one cannot exert an
influence that one does not enjoy, and in the global arena, influence
is built more often by diplomacy and by behavior that exemplifies
one’s stated values than by force.  Thus even if the founding instru-
ment of, say, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the Organiza-
tion of American States is silent on a particular issue, the United
States may find that it must acknowledge fellow members’ views on
that issue in order to remain in good stead within those organizations.
The same may be true with respect to transnational actors that hold
116
UDHR, supra note 27.  The United States is party to more than a hundred trea-
ties on the matter of extradition alone.  IGOR I. KAVASS, A GUIDE TO THE U.S. TREATIES
IN FORCE 474-83 (2001).
117
See U.S. CONST. art. VI (providing that “all Treaties made . . . under the Author-
ity of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land”); The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (declaring “[i]nternational law is part of our law”).  Compare
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common
Law:  A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997) (refuting tradition
that customary international law is enforceable in U.S. courts), and Phillip R. Trimble,
A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665 (1986) (same),
with Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824
(1998) (defending traditional view).
118
Compare International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art.
49, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 185 [hereinafter ICCPR] (establishing periodic reporting as
states parties’ least onerous compliance burden), with Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results
of the Uruguay Round, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) (providing for state submission of
trade disputes to an international dispute-settlement body with the authority to declare
state measures as violative of WTO obligations and to authorize retaliation if the meas-
ures are not corrected), reprinted in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS:  THE LEGAL TEXTS
353, 354 (1999).
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no government portfolio yet at times work with the United States to-
ward shared goals.119
Correctly drawn, therefore, the U.S. legal map depicts a dynamic
of norm systems and legal regimes that interact at different times, at
different levels, and with different effects.  Recognition of other laws
may bring to the fore other responses to similar problems and thus
reveal national law, though still most familiar, as a choice that is by no
means either natural or unavoidable.  Indeed, it is conflict that now
appears inevitable.  Competition among systems must be accounted
for and resolved, and insights from the field of conflict of laws, which
long has addressed competition in private-law areas, would aid eyes-
open legal analysis of U.S. initiatives that stir international concern.
No such analysis was employed in the first years of the United States’s
executive detention policy, and the results were tragic.
119
As one example, the American Bar Association, which operates across borders
via its Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative, aids U.S.-led efforts to reconstruct
Iraq’s judicial system.  See Am. Bar Ass’n, Iraq Employment and Volunteer Opportunities, at
http://www.abanet.org/iraq/jobs.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005) (listing job open-
ings for ABA legal assistance in Iraq).  On the other hand, the ABA has condemned
U.S. treatment of Iraqi detainees, and its president has called for the establishment of
“an independent, bipartisan commission” to investigate abuse allegations.  Letter from
Robert J. Grey, Jr., President of the American Bar Association, to George W. Bush,
President of the United States (Feb. 1, 2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/
leadership/letters/president.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2005); see also Am. Bar Ass’n. et
al., Report to the House of Delegates (adopted by voice vote Aug. 9, 2004) (setting
forth a resolution and report that “condemns any use of torture or other cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment upon persons within the custody or under
the physical control of the United States government (including its contractors) and
any endorsement or authorization of such measures by government lawyers, officials
and agents,” and further urging the United States “to comply fully” with international
law proscribing such treatment), available at http://www.abanet.org/media/docs/
torturereport10b.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).  On the roles that transnational ac-
tors play, see, for example, Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan:  Loyalty, Identity and
Community in Law and Practice, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 359 (1996); Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy, 24
MICH. J. INT’L L. 1041 (2003).
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III.  UNSEEN LAW AND DETENTION
Understood as a web of norms and regimes that constrain behav-
ior, “law” interweaves with “policy.”120  Evaluation of law thus calls for
scrutiny of actions taken at legal fora and at other sites, not only by
lawmakers and law interpreters, but also by law implementers.  With
respect to detention, it is thus appropriate to examine the actions not
only of the civilian executive and judicial officers who set and re-
viewed policy, but also of the military and other personnel who car-
ried it out.121  Each such actor had a constitutional duty to follow the
law.  How each discharged that duty depended on what laws the actor
“saw”; that is, on what constraints each acknowledged, understood,
and believed worth honoring.
There was no dearth of laws when the counterattack in Afghani-
stan began to yield thousands of captives.  To the contrary, there ex-
isted a complex map of norms and doctrines, enforcement regimes,
and compliance mechanisms, each touching on the proper nature
and scope of executive detention in time of conflict or other crisis.
There was, of course, national law.  Potentially relevant in the U.S.
Constitution were provisions that allocate power to the three branches
of government, that describe procedures for suspension of habeas
corpus and punishment for treason, and that protect the accused and
other individuals against undue governmental intrusions.122  Also rele-
vant were federal statutes, as well as judicial interpretations of statutes
and the Constitution.123  Federal regulations, particularly those of the
military, came into play.124  Rules regarding detention could be found
120
See supra text accompanying notes 72-74, 95-99.
121
Lamentably, Congress paid virtually no public heed to executive detention un-
til disclosure of abuses at Abu Ghraib.  See Amann, supra note 7, at 292-95.  Congres-
sional hearings were held as a consequence of that disclosure; however, by the end of
the first quarter of 2005 no other legislative action had been taken with regard to the
conditions or the fact of detention, in Iraq or elsewhere.  See supra notes 69-70 and ac-
companying text.
122
U.S. CONST. arts. I-II, VI, amends. IV-VI, VIII.
123
Potentially relevant laws included the habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(2002), the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2002), and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-
2340A (Supp. 2003), which implemented the Convention Against Torture, supra note
16.  Jurisprudence touching on issues at hand encompassed Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339
U.S. 763 (1950); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Ex parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1 (1942); and Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).  See generally Amann, supra
note 7, at 285-99 (discussing these and other relevant Supreme Court opinions).
124
Among the most important is Military Police:  Enemy Prisoners of War, Re-
tained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, Army Reg. 190-8,
OPNAVINST 3461.6, AFJI 31-304, MCO 3461.1 (effective Nov. 1, 1997) [hereinafter
2005] ABU GHRAIB 2121
in customary international law125 and in treaties to which the United
States is a party, such as the Geneva Conventions on the laws of war,
the Convention Against Torture, and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.126  Beyond these sources lay softer guideposts
for behavior, both national and extranational.  The historical and
ethical underpinnings of U.S. law could be placed in this category.127
So too could provisions in the half-century-old Universal and Inter-
American Declarations of Human Rights, as well as international bod-
ies’ interpretations of such provisions.128  Also at issue were the views
of individuals, governments, and organizations with which the
United States shares bedrock values and contemporary policy
goals.129
According to these sources,130 each person has certain basic rights
that no state may infringe without adequate justification.  To place
AR 190-8], available at http://www.nimj.com/documents/POW_AR_190-8.pdf (last
visited Mar. 22, 2005).
125
A state is said to violate customary international law “if, as a matter of state
policy, it practices, encourages, or condones . . . prolonged arbitrary detention.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
(1987), quoted in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2768-69 (2004) (indicating
that a violation entails more than “relatively brief detention in excess of positive
authority”).  Among the customary rules that regulate detention conditions is the ban
on torture, a jus cogens norm from which no derogation is permitted.  See, e.g., Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[O]fficial torture is prohibited by univer-
sally accepted norms of international law . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Ex parte Pinochet
Uguarte (No. 3) [2000] 1 A.C. 147, 198 (H.L. 1999) (Eng.) (“The jus cogens nature of
the international crime of torture justifies states in taking universal jurisdiction over
torture whenever committed.”).
126
See Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, arts. 1-3; ICCPR, supra note 118,
arts. 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14-16; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 5, arts. 2-5, 8-13, 17,
20, 23, 46, 63, 65, 69, 71-72, 99-118, 130; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 5, arts.
2, 3, 5, 27, 41-43, 64-79, 147; see also Amann, supra note 7, at 276-77, 303, 313, 322, 325,
327-29, 331-37 (discussing pertinence of each of these sources).
127
See Amann, supra note 7, at 310 (citing THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 1 (U.S. 1776) as exemplar of United States’s fundamental rights tradition).
128
American Declaration of Rights, supra note 92, arts. I, XVII, XVIII, XXV;
UDHR, supra note 27, arts. 5, 10, 11; see also Amann, supra note 7, at 311-16, 319-22,
327-29, 331-33, 335-36 (discussing relevant opinions of international human rights
bodies).
129
See Diane Marie Amann, “Raise the Flag and Let It Talk”:  On the Use of External
Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 597 (2004) [hereinafter
Amann, Norms] (positing shared tradition of fundamental rights and shared experi-
ence as threshold criteria for national courts’ consultation of international norms); see
also Amann, supra note 7, at 270-73 (citing criticism from International Committee for
the Red Cross, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, British Law
Lord, Spanish Foreign Minister, and Nobel Peace Prize winner).
130
National and extranational authorities establishing the contours described in
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someone in state custody constitutes a serious deprivation of individ-
ual liberty, to be undertaken only within certain limits.  The state
therefore must have due cause for confinement.  Within a reasonable
period of time, the state must plead its cause to a competent and neu-
tral arbiter who, after hearing from the detainee, decides whether cus-
tody may continue.  Trial of a detainee must adhere to fair process
norms.  Detention typically must end as soon as the reason for it dissi-
pates.  Detainees have the right to be free from torture and to be
treated humanely—rights that apply to interrogation no less than to
other aspects of detention.  In short, despite disparate origins, these
varied sources evinced considerable agreement about the permissible
contours of confinement.  That is not to say that all these laws should,
or could, be applied to every one of the more than 50,000 persons
who fell into U.S. hands in the first years of its campaign against ter-
rorism.131  Certain sources were applicable only to certain situations.
Furthermore, some sources overlapped, so that different rules, or dif-
ferent enforcement mechanisms, purported to govern the same situa-
tion.  Key actors proved unable to see or, alternatively, unwilling to
accommodate these discrepancies.
A.  The Executive:  “Curious Legalism”
The U.S. Executive flatly refused to give post-September 11 de-
tainees access to counsel or to the courts.  It unapologetically ac-
corded detainees something less than fundamental fairness.  President
Bush declared, “Either you are with us, or you are with the terror-
ists.”132  The latter, Vice President Dick Cheney said, “‘don’t deserve
this paragraph are detailed in Amann, supra note 7, at 301-04, 310-19 (discussing fun-
damental rights and due process); id. at 319-23 (outlining requirement of review of the
lawfulness of detention); id. at 335-44 (setting forth requirement of due cause and
temporal limitations); id. at 325-29 (discussing ban on torture); id. at 323-35 (stating
guarantees of humane treatment).
131
In August 2004, an independent panel wrote, with regard to sites in Iraq, in
Afghanistan, and at Guantánamo:  “A cumulative total of 50,000 detainees have been
in the custody of the U.S. forces since November 2001, with a peak population of
11,000 in the month of March 2004.”  SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 59, at 11.  The
number of Iraqi detainees remained high at the end of the first quarter of 2005.  See
Matt Kelley, Number of Prisoners Held by U.S. in Iraq Doubled in Five Months, AP
WORLDSTREAM NEWSWIRE, Mar. 30, 2005, Westlaw, APWORLD database (reporting
that the United States was holding approximately 10,500 persons in Iraq, 100 of whom
were younger than 18).
132
President George W. Bush, Speech to Joint Session of Congress (Sept. 20,
2001), transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/
20010920-8.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
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the same guarantees and safeguards that would be used for an Ameri-
can citizen going through the normal judicial process.’”133  The Execu-
tive professed to have forbidden torture, but on its own terms:  it re-
buffed claims that national or international law cabined its policy.  It
maintained that war had broken out on September 11, a new and
perhaps endless war, in which the President enjoys plenary power of
combat.  In support of this proposition, its public pronouncements
relied on the Constitution’s Commander-in-Chief clauses and a few
World War II-era precedents, and implied that no other law mat-
tered.134
The torrent of documents leaked in the course of the Abu Ghraib
scandal revealed that, in point of fact, government lawyers had been
well aware of the intricate legal terrain that the executive detention
policy was traversing.  Confidential legal memoranda concluded,
among other things, that offshore detainees had no right of access to
U.S. courts; that certain cruel, inhuman, or degrading acts would not
violate U.S. laws against torture; and that ghosting persons out of the
country of detention would not transgress a Geneva Convention pro-
hibition on forcible transfers.135  They did so not by reiterating the ipse
dixits that had characterized public statements, but by interposing
what Professor Kim Lane Scheppele aptly called a “curious legalism
around the spaces” on law’s map.136  Initial focus on domestic law soon
made room for lengthy discussions of jurisprudence in countries like
Israel, of treaty regimes to which the United States belongs, and of
one regime, that created by Europe’s human rights treaty, to which it
does not.137
133
Peter Slevin & George Lardner, Jr., Bush Plan for Terrorism Trials Defended,
WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2001, at A28 (quoting Vice President Cheney).
134
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when
called into the actual Service of the United States . . . .”); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339
U.S. 763 (1950); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).  For a recitation of the govern-
ment’s oft-stated position see, for example, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633,  2639
(2004) (plurality opinion) (declining to reach the government’s contention “that no
explicit congressional authorization is required, because the Executive possesses ple-
nary authority to detain pursuant to Article II of the Constitution”).
135
See Bybee Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 27; Goldsmith Memoran-
dum, supra note 63; Gonzales Memorandum, supra note 9; Philbin/Yoo Memorandum,
supra note 26.
136
Discussion with Kim Lane Scheppele, John J. O’Brien Professor of Comparative
Law and Sociology, University of Pennsylvania Law School, at the University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review Symposium (Nov. 12, 2004).
137
See Bybee Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 27, at 14-15, 27-31 (analyzing
jurisprudence in Israel, under Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, and pursu-
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In form, the memoranda seemed to pay heed to conflict of laws.
But in substance, they constituted efforts to avoid genuine conflicts
analysis, to dodge consequences that might flow if full recognition
were given to disparate legal regimes.  An example is the memoran-
dum that approved the practice of ghosting non-Iraqi detainees out of
Iraq so that they might endure interrogation at some other location.
Written by the author of a leading conflicts casebook, the memoran-
dum treated the matter as a question of choice of law, and concluded
that Geneva law would not forbid transfers of “illegal aliens from oc-
cupied territory pursuant to local immigration law.”138  The memo-
randum made no mention of a contextual point that deserved consid-
eration; that is, the shambled state of the Iraqi legal system in the year
after invasion.
Other legal memoranda, particularly those that established legal
sanction for the Executive’s detention and interrogation policies, re-
lied on a legal opinion that the Constitution gives the “President
alone” power to determine “any terrorist threat, the amount of mili-
tary force to be used in response, or the method, timing, and nature
of the response,” in order to deflect treaty language that might have
circumscribed executive action.139  In this they were aided by law.  The
last century had taught that ready obedience to positive enactment
could wreak grave injustices.140  In reaction came international human
ant to European Convention, supra note 105, art. 5(1)); supra note 27 (describing var-
ied legal sources cited in other memoranda).
138 Goldsmith Memorandum, supra note 63, at 4; see also BRILMAYER & GOLDSMITH
supra note 76.  The memorandum reached this conclusion notwithstanding that Ge-
neva law proscribes “[i]ndividual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of
protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or
to that of any other country . . . regardless of their motive.”  Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion, supra note 5, art. 49, quoted in Goldsmith Memorandum, supra note 63, at 1 n.1.  It
further concluded that even Iraqis might be removed “to facilitate interrogation, for a
brief but not indefinite period, so long as adjudicative proceedings have not been ini-
tiated against them.”  Goldsmith Memorandum, supra note 63, at 2.
139
The quoted language is from Memorandum re:  The President’s Constitutional
Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting
Them, from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to Timothy Flannigan,
Deputy Counsel to the President (Sept. 25, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
olc/warpowers925.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2005), a memorandum on which later
analyses of treaty obligations relied.  Bybee Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 27,
at 32; Working Group Report, supra note 27, at 20-24; Yoo/Delahunty Memorandum,
supra note 26, at 11 & n.22.
140
Among the many studies of how the legal profession behaved within authoritar-
ian regimes are DAVID DYZENHAUS, TRUTH, RECONCILIATION AND THE APARTHEID
LEGAL ORDER (1998); INGO MÜLLER, HITLER’S JUSTICE:  THE COURTS OF THE THIRD
REICH (Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., 1991); RICHARD H. WEISBERG, VICHY LAW
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rights law, which reflects the universalist tendencies of ancient natural
law yet is codified in positive instruments of law.141  Yet the internal en-
forceability of those instruments remained subject to the buffer
mechanisms that public international law condones.142  It was on these
mechanisms that government lawyers relied in order to insulate the
United States from the effect of international obligations assumed
when it became a state party to certain treaties.  The Geneva frame-
work was dismissed as inapplicable to the instant “war on terror,” ei-
ther by its terms143 or as customary international law.144  As for the
Convention Against Torture, memoranda pointed to the two reserva-
tions, five understandings, and one declaration that the United States
had attached to ratification.  According to one such condition, the
Convention requires the United States to refrain only from acts that
its own Constitution also prohibits; according to another, the Conven-
tion is unenforceable in U.S. courts except by passage of implement-
ing legislation.145  Congress had enacted such a statute, but one con-
AND THE HOLOCAUST IN FRANCE (1996); Detlev F. Vagts, International Law in the Third
Reich, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 661 (1990).  The authority of positive law was the subject of the
noted Hart-Fuller debate.  H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,
71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 593 (1958) (defending “the Positivist School of jurisprudence”);
Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV.
630 (1958) (responding to Professor Hart’s argument).
141
On the “natural-positive” nature of human rights law, see Amann, supra note
87, at 196-97 (discussing Antonio Cassese, Y-a-t-il un conflit insurmontable entre
souveraineté des États et justice pénale internationale?, in CRIMES INTERNATIONAUX ET
JURIDICTIONS INTERNATIONALES 20 (Antonio Cassese & Mireille Delmas-Marty eds.,
2002)).
142
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
143
See Memorandum re:  Application of Treaties and Laws to Al Qaeda and Tali-
ban Detainees, from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto R. Gonzales,
Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Depart-
ment of Defense 9-25 (Jan. 22, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee Treaties Memorandum] (re-
jecting applicability of Geneva law, and further stating that the President can “sus-
pend” any U.S. obligations under such law), available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-srv/nation/documents/012202bybee.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).  See gen-
erally Yoo/Delahunty Memorandum, supra note 26 (making similar arguments); Work-
ing Group Report, supra note 27, at 4 (rejecting the applicability of Geneva Conven-
tions).
144
See Bybee Treaties Memorandum, supra note 143, at 32 (explicitly rejecting
“many” jurists’ contrary view to declare that “[c]ustomary international law . . . cannot
bind the executive branch under the Constitution because it is not federal law”), relied
on in Working Group Report, supra note 27, at 6.
145
U.S. Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations to the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment §§ I(1), III(1), 136
CONG. REC. S17486-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) [hereinafter Torture Reservations]; see
also Working Group Report, supra note 27, at 6; Bybee Interrogation Memorandum,
supra note 27, at 2-22.  Similar arguments were made to limit the effect of the
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taining qualifiers146 that afforded the memoranda a fig leaf of legal,
though not moral, defensibility.147
The disclosed memoranda provided rare and troubling evidence
of the deliberate construction of a framework that appeared to be
ruled by law, but was not.  The framework might better be termed “le-
galist” rather than “legal”; within it, the only laws recognized were
those allowing free rein for presidential prerogative dressed in the
guise of legal constraints.148  For more than two years, laws that the
Executive chose neither to acknowledge nor to accommodate seemed
not to operate as law at all.
B.  The Court:  Blindered Justice
The period within which the Executive enjoyed unfettered discre-
tion to detain and interrogate persons it considered enemies ended
with the Supreme Court’s issuance of the Rasul-Hamdi-Padilla trilogy.
That the Court had affirmed its power of judicial review was clear.  Its
rationale for that decision was anything but:  in the ten separate opin-
ICCPR, see supra note 118 and accompanying text, in Working Group Report, supra
note 27, at 6.
146
See Torture Reservations, supra note 145, § II(1), (2) (containing same qualifiers).
Compare Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, art. 1 (defining “torture” as involv-
ing “severe pain or suffering”), with 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1), (2) (reciting this definition,
then further defining “severe pain or suffering” to mean “prolonged mental harm”
arising in four specific scenarios).
147 Sanford Levinson, Cruel But No Longer Unusual, L.A. TIMES BOOK REV., Nov. 21,
2004, at R4 (stating, in review of MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH (2004), that
these qualifiers rendered the memoranda “legally defensible, if morally repulsive,” so
that “Congress may deserve a full measure of blame” for the memoranda’s “extreme”
definitions of torture); see also Bybee Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 27, at 1;
Working Group Report, supra note 27, at 7-16.  Referring to these qualifiers, a self-
described drafter of the Bybee Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 27, later de-
fended the memorandum thusly:  “While the definition of torture in the August 2002
memo is narrow, that was Congress’ choice.”  John Yoo, Behind the ‘Torture Memos,’ SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 2, 2005, at 1.
148
See Amann, supra note 7, at 285-87 (describing Executive’s construction).
Richard B. Bilder & Detlev F. Vagts, Speaking Law to Power:  Lawyers and Torture, 98 AM.
J. INT’L L. 689, 694-95 (2004) (questioning effect and advisability of memoranda,
which “raise even profounder issues regarding the government lawyers’ commitment
to principles of ordinary morality and decency, as well as the rule of law—particularly
in the context of an ongoing ‘war on terror’”); George C. Harris, The Rule of Law and
the War on Terrorism:  The Professional Responsibilities of Executive Branch Lawyers in the
Wake of 9/11, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2005) (analyzing “perfect
storm” of factors that were present when memoranda were written and “resulted in a
narrowly considered and extreme view of executive authority”).
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ions that made up the trilogy, different groupings of Justices gravi-
tated toward different sources of law.
The three cases bore many transnational characteristics.  Detain-
ees had traveled, or had been transported, across national borders.
All but one held citizenship in a country other than the United States,
and the pleadings of each cited international treaties and custom as
well as U.S. law.  The circumstances of detention had given rise to
international outcry and, eventually, briefs cataloguing international
legal norms at odds with the Executive’s policy.149  In recent years,
moreover, a majority of the Court had looked to international law
in the course of deciding that execution of mentally retarded per-
sons constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, and that criminal
prosecution of same-sex intimacy violates due process.150  Although
these considerations militated in favor of consulting external
norms,151 the Court’s detention trilogy approached such norms with
delicacy.
In large part, the trilogy eschewed extranational law in favor of
domestic sources; yet even as to the latter there was considerable dis-
149
See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Global Rights in Support of Petitioners at 1,
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696) (arguing that the Executive
violated its obligations under international law); Brief of Amici Curiae International
Law Professors Listed Herein in Support of Petitioners at 3-5, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124
S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696) (stating that international law should be an “essential
element” of the decision and that human rights instruments of other countries indi-
cate the right to meaningful judicial review); Brief of Amici Curiae Practitioners and
Specialists in the International Law of War in Support of Respondents at 3, Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004) (No. 03-1027) (contending that the laws of war do not
support Executive’s policy); Brief for the National Institute of Military Justice as Ami-
cus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (Nos.
03-334, 03-343) (“[B]oth domestic military law and the international law of war have
advanced, increasing the role of the judiciary . . . .”).  But see, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae
of Law Professors, Former Legal Advisers of the Department of State and Ambassadors,
Retired Judge Advocates General and Retired Military Commanders, and Other Inter-
national Law Specialists in Support of Respondents at 14-29, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct.
2686 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343) (arguing that international legal sources supported
Executive’s policy at Guantánamo).
150
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-77 (2003) (discussing English law and ju-
risprudence of European Court of Human Rights in holding sodomy law unconstitu-
tional); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (noting opposition of “world
community” to “imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally re-
tarded offenders”); accord Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1200 (2005) (finding an
“overwhelming” world opinion against executing juvenile offenders, “respected and
significant confirmation for our own conclusions,” in case decided after issuance of
detention trilogy, that the practice violates the Constitution).
151
See Amann, Norms, supra note 129, at 604 (discussing detention and consulta-
tion of external norms).
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agreement regarding what internal law mattered.  Justice Stevens’s
opinion for the Court in Rasul focused on federal statutory law, but-
tressed by the common law tradition of habeas corpus.152  The em-
bodiment of that tradition in the Constitution’s Suspension Clause
seemed all that mattered to Stevens, and Scalia, in Hamdi.153  In that
same case other Justices granted the Executive much leeway by dint of
a terse congressional resolution, passed a week after September 11,
which said not a word about detention.154  Opinions that centered on
one source, moreover, tended not to explicate their disregard of
sources that other opinions deemed controlling.
Some Justices appeared to agree with the Executive’s assertion
that the United States was in “a state of war.”155  From this determina-
tion flowed the Court’s decision in Hamdi to permit continued deten-
tion.  In time of war, wrote the plurality, the Executive may hold “en-
emy combatants” without charge if Congress so authorizes—for the
reason that such detention is “a fundamental incident of waging
war.”156  The plurality cited the Third Geneva Convention as support
for the rule permitting detention of combatants.157  That Convention
152
See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2692-99.
153
See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2660-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Absent Suspension,
however, the Executive’s assertion of military exigency has not been thought sufficient
to permit detention without charge . . . [and] [n]o one contends that the congres-
sional [statute] . . . is an implementation of the Suspension Clause.”).
154
See id. at 2639-40 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (holding that the Authoriza-
tion for the Use of Military Force is an “explicit congressional authorization for the
detention of individuals”); see also id. at 2679 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Congress has authorized the President to detain “those arranged against our
troops”).
155 See id. at 2649-50 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (presupposing that the Ex-
ecutive is currently waging war); see also id. at 2639 (accepting with regard to Afghani-
stan that the United States was participating in in armed conflict); id. at 2674 (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (“This detention falls squarely within the Federal Government’s war
powers . . . .”); cf. id. at 2652-53 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment) (stating, more circumspectly, simply that the allegation
that Hamdi had been “seized on the field of battle in Afghanistan” was “undisputed,”
and later stating that the “Government’s stated factual justification for incommunicado
detention is a war on terrorism”); id. at 2660 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring simply to
the “allegation” that Hamdi is an “enemy combatant”).  The assertion that the United
States is in a state of war has been the subject of much debate.  See, e.g., Amann, supra
note 7, at 288 (describing how the “war” the United States is waging “bears little re-
semblance” to the traditional model of war); Brooks, supra note 92, at 711-43 (discuss-
ing blurring of boundaries between war and other contexts subject to legal regula-
tion).
156
Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2641 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).
157
See id. at 2641 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (citing Third Geneva Conven-
tion, supra note 5, art. 118, for the proposition that “prisoners of war shall be released
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also inspired the plurality’s suggestion that challenges to detention
could be handled by military panels, as opposed to civilian judges.158
At several junctures, therefore, the plurality indicated that it was hon-
oring international, and not just internal, laws of war.  On this it was
wrong, and its error cost Hamdi his liberty and, eventually, his U.S.
citizenship.
The Geneva framework applies only to “armed conflict,” and not
all of the U.S. “war on terror” qualifies.159  Even if the framework did
apply, it was not followed:  as Justices Souter and Ginsburg pointed
out, the conditions of Hamdi’s detention did not adhere to the re-
quirements of the Third Geneva Convention.160  The precedent for
detaining citizens whom the Executive has labeled enemy combatants
is not the Third Convention, but rather Ex parte Quirin, a U.S. opinion
that predates it.161  Quirin does not obtain internationally; to the con-
trary, by their terms, the 1949 Geneva Conventions do not protect citi-
zens of the detaining country.162  The only law that controlled, there-
and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities”).
158
See id. at 2651 (citing AR 190-8, supra note 124, § 1-6, at 2, which incorporates
as U.S. military law the Third Geneva Convention, supra note 5, art. 5, and stating that
military tribunals are allowed to determine the status of enemy detainees).
159
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 5, common art. 2; see also Rona, supra
note 92, at 64-68 (describing “misguided assertions” about the “War on Terror”).
160
Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2658 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment).  Among other things, the Third
Geneva Convention, supra note 5, art. 5, requires the detaining power to treat an indi-
vidual as a prisoner of war unless a tribunal convened under Article 5 finds otherwise.
In that event, the person ordinarily would fall under the aegis of the Fourth Geneva
Convention, supra note 5, art. 4, a treaty that the Court’s trilogy never mentioned.
Both conventions require a degree of access to the outside world, with which incom-
municado detention does not comport.
161
317 U.S. 1 (1942).  The plurality admitted as much, citing Quirin as sole sup-
port for the proposition that “[t]here is no bar to this Nation’s holding one of its own
citizens as an enemy combatant.”  Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640 (O’Connor, J., plurality
opinion).
162
On the relation of Quirin and the U.S. war on terror to contemporary interna-
tional humanitarian law, see, for example, Knut Dörmann, The Legal Situation of “Un-
lawful/Unprivileged Combatants,” 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 45, 48 (2003).  Cf. Rona, su-
pra note 92 (discussing the U.S. war on terror in light of international humanitarian
law).  On the inapplicability of the Conventions to nationals of the detaining power,
see Dörmann, supra, at 48-49 (discussing the Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 5,
art. 4(1), which describes as protected those persons who “find themselves, in case of a
conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of
which they are not nationals”).  See also Third Geneva Convention, supra note 5, art. 87
(implying its nonapplicability to a detaining power’s nationals by stating that “[w]hen
fixing the penalty, the courts or authorities of the Detaining Power shall take into con-
sideration, to the widest extent possible, the fact that the accused, not being a national
of the Detaining Power, is not bound to it by any duty of allegiance”); Amann, supra
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fore, was U.S. law.  In the view of at least four Justices, U.S. law stand-
ing alone afforded Hamdi considerable protection:  at the least, the
guarantee of evenhanded review of detention by a competent judici-
ary; at the most, disposition according to the strictures of U.S. crimi-
nal procedure.163  The failure to see this interplay between interna-
tional and domestic law resulted in a judgment that invoked
international law not to assure just treatment of an individual, but
rather to justify the denial of protection that he might have been af-
forded upon careful consideration of his own country’s law.
In contrast with its effects in Hamdi, international law may have
had a salutary, albeit sub silentio, effect in Rasul.  In the 1990s, the
Court had declined to extend the Fourth Amendment to a noncitizen
defendant subjected to a warrantless search in Mexico;164 permitted
U.S. prosecution of a noncitizen kidnapped abroad;165 and withheld
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination from a wit-
ness who feared that his compelled testimony would be used against
him in a foreign prosecution.166  A judgment in Rasul that persons
held beyond U.S. borders had no hope of redress from U.S. courts
would have been in keeping with these precedents.  Instead, the deci-
sion in Rasul departed from this path.  It held that overseas detainees
indeed may seek relief in U.S. courts—not only writs of habeas corpus
for violations of U.S. law and treaties, but also civil damages for viola-
tions of international law.167  No precedent, it wrote, “categorically ex-
cludes aliens detained in military custody outside the United States
from the ‘“the privilege of litigation”’ in U.S. courts.”168  This phrasing
implied an assertion of jurisdiction more consistent with the jurispru-
note 7, at 276 (“It may have no application to a U.S. citizen . . . .”).
163
See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2660 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment) (affording Hamdi “a fair
chance . . . before a neutral decision maker”); id. (Scalia, J., joined by Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (“Where the Government accuses a citizen of waging war against it, our con-
stitutional tradition has been to prosecute him in federal court . . . .”).
164
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990).
165
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992).
166
United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 669 (1998).
167
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2698-99 (citing as avenues for relief the habeas statute, 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (2000), the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000), and the
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)); cf. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct.
2739, 2765 (2004) (affirming, in a judgment issued the day after Rasul, that non-
Americans who suffer violations of international norms considered universal might be
able to seek compensation in U.S. courts via the Alien Tort Statute).
168
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2698 (quoting Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1139
(2003) (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777-78 (1950))).
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dence of the inter-American, European, and U.N. human rights sys-
tems169 than with the Court’s own recent jurisprudence.  The decision
in Rasul omitted any citation to such external law even as it opened a
path toward the exercise of U.S. judicial review of the plight of per-
sons held well beyond the island of Cuba, perhaps as far away as Af-
ghanistan and Iraq.
The latter two countries remained foremost in Americans’ minds
the entire time that the Court had Rasul, Hamdi, and Padilla under
advisement.  Horrific evidence of detainee abuse had become public
just hours after oral arguments ended, and the evidence mounted as
the Justices wrote.  No opinion made explicit mention of this abuse.
Yet four Justices spoke of torture—an issue central to the Abu Ghraib
scandal but not raised in the cases at bar—in the course of condemn-
ing Padilla’s indefinite, incommunicado detention.  “At stake in this
case,” they wrote, “is nothing less than the essence of a free society. . . .
Unconstrained Executive detention for the purpose of investigating
and preventing subversive activity is the hallmark of the Star Cham-
ber.”170  Having raised the specter of that loathed and secret tool by
which old English monarchs extracted information, the four ob-
served, “‘There is torture of mind as well as body; the will is as much
affected by fear as by force.  And there comes a point where this Court
should not be ignorant as judges of what we know as men.’”171
169
See Amann, supra note 7, at 311-19 (discussing relaxation of extraterritoriality
limits in, for example, Bankovic v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001)
(providing decision as to the admissibility of Application No. 52207/99), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2005); Case
10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 109/99, OEA/ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. (1999); Saldias de
Lopez v. Uruguay, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 36th Sess., Annex XIX, at 176, U.N.
Doc. A/36/40 (1981)).
170
Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2735 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting).  For an account by a British judge of interrogation practices during the
heyday of the Star Chamber, see David Hope, Torture, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 807, 809-
10 (2004).
171
Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2735 n.10 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg &
Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J., plurality opinion)).  The comment suggested a reluctance on the part of the Court
to abandon a tradition of circumscribing methods of interrogation, even in service of
the Executive’s antiterrorism campaign.  Indicative of this treatment is Rogers v. Rich-
mond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961), which cited Watts and other authorities in support of the
statement that the ban on coerced confessions exists not because:
[S]uch confessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods used to
extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our crimi-
nal law:  that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system—a system
in which the State must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely
secured and may not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out of
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C.  The Military:  Matter of Perspective
The Court’s message—that U.S. judges stood ready to review the
lawfulness of executive detention and of methods of interrogation—
arrived too late to affect how military personnel treated captives in
the first years of the campaign against terrorism.  Detention centers
were in essence lands without law.  At these sites a number of risk
factors converged, so that  abuse came to be tolerated, even encour-
aged.
Individuals within a given milieu may come to form discrete popu-
lations.  Group cohesion necessarily entails emphasis on similarities
among members.  But it also entails emphasis of difference; that is,
delineation of group traits, appearances, and attitudes that are unlike
those held by others in the environment.  Group cohesion thus de-
pends in part on identification of an other.  Police officers, for exam-
ple, may come to view their work through the lens of an “‘Us versus
Them’ mentality,” suspicious not only of those believed to be doing
wrong, but also of the law-abiding public at large.172  When otheriza-
tion takes the form of dehumanization—when an other group is seen
as less human, less deserving of dignity, less capable of goodness—
otherwise moral and passive individuals may come to act with
aggressive abandon.173  In short, division carries with it a risk that
either population will engage in abuse against the other.174
his own mouth.
Id. at 540-41.
172
The quoted phrase appeared in the report of a panel charged with examining
problems in New York City’s police force.  MILTON MOLLEN ET AL., CITY OF NEW YORK,
ANATOMY OF A FAILURE:  A PATH FOR SUCCESS 1 (1994) (attributing problems in part
to “hostility and alienation between the police and community . . . which breeds an
‘Us versus Them’ mentality”), available at http://www.parc.info/reports/pdf/
mollenreport.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2005), quoted in Barbara E. Armacost, Organiza-
tional Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 501 (2004).  Crimi-
nologists likewise have attributed to police officers the “‘working personality’” of the
“‘street cop,’” typically described as suspicious, isolated socially from anyone but other
officers, and living in an environment marked by the constant threat of danger and the
authority that comes with the badge.  Armacost, supra, at 512-14 (discussing inter alia
ELIZABETH REUSS-IANNI, TWO CULTURES OF POLICE:  STREET COPS AND MANAGEMENT
COPS 1-16, 121-26 (1983); JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL:  LAW
ENFORCEMENT IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 42-58 (2d ed. 1975)).
173
For interdisciplinary literature explaining these phenomena, see Laurel E.
Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair:  Rethinking the Contribution of
Justice to Reconciliation, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 573, 606-17 (2002).
174
See id. at 607 n.118 (surveying social psychological studies that explain crowd
misbehavior, with emphasis on “dehumanization and lessening of personal responsibil-
ity” as factors that lead individuals to shed inhibitions (citing inter alia Albert Bandura
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Such distinction is endemic to prison.  Firearms, jail bars, and uni-
forms set inmates irrevocably apart from guards.  Often there is over-
crowding of inmates, some of whom suffer from mental illness.175  The
lines of race, color, or culture that divide a society typically divide its
prisons as well.176  Prison is further marked by imbalance of power.
The guard holds the keys, not only to an inmate’s freedom of move-
ment, but also, during the frequent periods when no outside authority
is looking, to the inmate’s freedom from harm.  The risks of abuse
proved overwhelming in a well-known simulation in which college
students were assigned to be guards or inmates.  Researchers ended
the study prematurely, citing the “negative, hostile, affrontive and de-
humanising” encounters among subjects who rapidly had absorbed
the passive or aggressive mentalities of their roles.177
Aggression is, of course, part of the military role.  Members of the
armed forces are trained to defend themselves, their loved ones, and
their allies by killing those whom their country names the enemy.
Acts of defense occur in frenzied snapshots of time, during which ac-
tors are scarcely able to ponder proper behavior toward a combatant
already seen as an other.  The risk of abuse is, again, inherent.  Expe-
et al., Disinhibition of Aggression Through Diffusion of Responsibility and Dehumanization of
Victims, 9 J. RES. PERSONALITY 253 (1975))).
175
See, e.g., RONALD BLACKBURN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT 277-78
(1993) (citing evidence of mental illness in British prisons); GARVIN MCCAIN ET AL.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE EFFECT OF PRISON CROWDING ON INMATE BEHAVIOR, at iv-
vii (1980) (linking prison problems such as illness complaints and disciplinary infrac-
tions to overcrowding); Craig Haney, Infamous Punishment:  The Psychological Conse-
quences of Isolation, in CORRECTIONAL PERSPECTIVES 161, 166-67 (Leanne Fiftal Alarid &
Paul F. Cromwell eds., 2002) (reporting on psychoses in California’s highest security
prison); Craig Haney, Psychology and the Limits to Prison Pain:  Confronting the Coming Cri-
sis in Eighth Amendment Law, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 499, 543 (1997) (referring to
the “large literature on the consequences of overcrowding,” which “has documented a
range of specific adverse effects” on inmates).
176
A salient example may be found in California, where the state’s Department of
Corrections long has used race as a factor for determining assignment of inmates to
double cells.  The U.S. Supreme Court, expressing concern that “racial classifications
threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in a racial group and
to incite racial hostility,” ordered a lower court on remand to apply the highest level of
scrutiny when determining whether the California practice violates the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection.  Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 1141, 1147 (2005) (in-
ternal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis supplied by Court); see also
Paige Austin, Guards; State Lied to Justices, PRESS-ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), Jan. 19,
2005, at A1 (quoting correctional officers’ allegations that racial segregation is perma-
nent, contrary to assertion that state’s lawyers made to Court).
177
Craig Haney et al., Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison, 1 INT’L J.
CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 69, 80 (1973), quoted in SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note
59, app. G at 1-3; Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 173, at 609.
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diency may result in deviation even from unequivocal rules, a fact that
traditionally has counseled the establishment of firm and clear laws.178
Responsible militaries endeavor to prevent abuse—to channel the vio-
lence that is essential to success—by disallowance of individual discre-
tion.  Service members learn to obey orders delivered within a rigid
chain of command.  The system depends on a structure of preexisting
constraints; that is, on the promulgation of a framework of laws within
which the military is to operate.  President Abraham Lincoln recog-
nized this when he commissioned the first codification of the modern
laws governing the conduct of war.179
Today’s military is trained to follow successors to that code; in par-
ticular, regulations adopted in accordance with the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions.  This body of law is ample.  Found among the 143 principal
articles and five annexes of the Third Geneva Convention, for in-
stance, is the requirement that prisoners of war be permitted to re-
ceive personal parcels containing “scientific equipment” or “sports
outfits.”180  The depth of detail is indicative of the view that limiting
discretion also limits opportunity for abuse of discretion.
Risk factors for abuse converged inside the centers of detention
that the military established in the course of the campaign against ter-
ror.  Many guards were reservists unexpectedly called to active duty,
transported to foreign lands.  There, with little corrections training,
they were expected to control often hostile inmates within the con-
178 Cf. Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw:  Constitutional Constraints
on Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 278, 322 (2003) (rejecting pro-
posal for authorization of warrants allowing torture, arguing that resulting torture
would exceed both bounds of warrant and “level of informal abuse under the cur-
rent regime”).
179
See L.C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 29 (2d ed.
2000) (describing genesis of Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United
States in the Field, General Orders No. 100 (Lieber Code) (Apr. 24, 1863), promul-
gated during the War Between the States).
180
Article 72 of the Third Geneva Convention, supra note 5, states in relevant part:
Prisoners of war shall be allowed to receive by post or by any other means in-
dividual parcels or collective shipments containing, in particular, foodstuffs,
clothing, medical supplies and articles of a religious, educational or recrea-
tional character which may meet their needs, including books, devotional ar-
ticles, scientific equipment, examination papers, musical instruments, sports
outfits and materials allowing prisoners of war to pursue their studies or their
cultural activities.
As they do with much of the Convention, U.S. military regulations incorporate this re-
quirement.  See AR 190-8, supra note 124, § 3-5(k), at 8 (stating that internees “may re-
ceive” packages of “[f]oodstuffs,” “[c]lothing,” “[m]edical supplies,” and “[a]rticles of
a religious, educational, or recreational nature”).
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fines of overcrowded jails devoid of a strict chain of command and
subject to daily attack.181  Some were asked to take part in extraction of
information; in Taguba’s words, to “set favorable conditions” for in-
terrogation.182  They went along with the request, in accordance with a
group mentality that had divided all into either “good guys” or “the
enemy.”183  Early on, no less a figure than the President had defined
the post-September 11 campaign as one of “us” versus “the terrorists,”
and the Vice President had elaborated that the latter were less deserv-
ing than Americans of fundamental rights.184  Executive officials later
sought to distinguish Iraqis from others captured during the cam-
paign, but that distinction did not prevent abuses.  In Iraq, in Af-
ghanistan, and at Guantánamo, inmates who looked, spoke, and wor-
shiped differently came to be seen and treated as others.  The “good
guys” versus “enemy” mindset aided toleration of things like forced
nudity—a widespread practice that an independent panel suggested
may have so dehumanized detainees that guards’ “moral and cultural
barriers” failed to operate to “preclude the abusive treatment of oth-
ers.”185  The researchers who conducted the prison simulation have
written that emphasis on external viewpoints—on rules that embody
values of an outside world untested by the immediate chaos—can
181
See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 59, at 43-56; id. app. G, at 7; TAGUBA
REPORT, supra note 21, at 10, 18, 21-33, 36-38; see also Abu Ghraib Called Filthy and Vola-
tile at Army Hearing, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2005, at A25 (describing witness’s testimony
that Abu Ghraib “‘was filthy, with rodents, rats, wild dogs and trash and an overpopula-
tion of prisoners’”).
182
See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 21, at 11.
183
See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 59, app. G, at 5 (discussing effects of phe-
nomena of “groupthink” and “enemy image”).
184
See supra text accompanying notes 132-133 (quoting President George W. Bush
and Vice President Dick Cheney).  Others in the administration echoed these senti-
ments, among them then-Attorney General John Ashcroft, who stated in prepared tes-
timony before Congress that new measures were “carefully drawn to target a narrow
class of individuals—terrorists.”  Excerpts from Attorney General’s Testimony Before Senate
Judiciary Committee, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, at B6.  Calling for “honest, reasoned de-
bate” on the permissible extent of such measures, he continued:
To those who pit Americans against immigrants and citizens against nonciti-
zens, to those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my
message is this:  Your tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode our national
unity and diminish our resolve.  They give ammunition to America’s enemies,
and pause to America’s friends.  They encourage people of good will to re-
main silent in the face of evil.
Id.
185
See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 59, app. G, at 7.  A retired FBI agent ech-
oed this observation regarding the effect of dehumanization on those who perpetrate
it when he told a reporter, “‘Brutalization doesn’t work.  We know that.  Besides, you
lose your soul.’”  Mayer, supra note 57, at 106.
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counterbalance what may seem to insiders like a standing invitation to
abuse.186  Post-September 11 detention thus should have proceeded
according to a pre-established law, seen, understood, and obeyed by
all.  That is not what happened.
Until the decision in Rasul, all that appeared to constrain military
action was the word of the Executive that was waging the new “war”
against terror.  During the conflict in Vietnam, the United States had
applied the Geneva framework despite perceived shortcomings.187
This time, on arrival of the first captives at Guantánamo, the Executive
disavowed the Geneva Conventions.  Then-presidential counsel Gon-
zales saw Geneva’s details, such as the requirement that personal par-
cels must be delivered, not as components of the military’s own code,
not as elements of the internal and international structure on which
legal conduct of military action depends, but rather as “quaint . . .
provisions” easily disregarded.188
The President’s decision not to adhere to Geneva law unmoored
the military.  Leaked memoranda revealed that for the first year at
Guantánamo, interrogators operated without the benefit of any guide-
lines.  These interrogators had been “trained to apply the Geneva
Conventions,” and so balked at doing “anything that could be consid-
ered ‘controversial.’”189  Their hesitation prompted clarification—in
the form of Rumsfeld’s authorization for harsh interrogation meas-
ures.190  Ostensibly intended only for Guantánamo, the techniques
found their way to Afghanistan and, eventually, to Iraq.191  The Execu-
tive said that it would honor the Geneva Conventions in Iraq; how-
186
See Craig Haney & Philip Zimbardo, The Past and Future of U.S. Prison Policy:
Twenty-Five Years After the Stanford Prison Experiment, 53 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 709, 721
(1998), discussed in SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 59, app. G, at 3.
187
See VERNON E. DAVIS, THE LONG ROAD HOME:  U.S. PRISONER OF WAR POLICY
AND PLANNING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 94-95 (2000) (giving an example of U.S. military
action conforming with the Geneva Conventions); TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND
VIETNAM:  AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 132 (1970) (lauding the U.S. government for re-
fraining from making claim that the Geneva Conventions did not apply because Viet-
nam conflict was not an official war); Daryl Mundis, The United States of America and In-
ternational Justice:  Has Lady Liberty Lost Her Way?, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 2, 6 n.16 (2004)
(noting that the United States routinely used tribunals during the Vietnam conflict in
order to ensure compliance with the Geneva Conventions).
188
Gonzales Memorandum, supra note 9, at 2 (referring to Article 75 of Third Ge-
neva Convention, supra note 5).
189
Beaver Memorandum, supra note 32, at 1.
190
Action Memorandum, supra note 32, discussed supra text accompanying notes
32-34.
191
SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 59, at 9, 68; see also TAGUBA REPORT, supra
note 21, at 8-9.
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ever, it failed to give guards sufficient training in or copies of those
treaties.192  Executive action created a legal void, one filled by official
statements and on-the-ground practices that condoned some harsh-
ness and so risked inviting more.  Generals freed from the restraint of
Geneva reportedly turned aside an FBI agent’s questions about inter-
rogation methods at Guantánamo with the explanation that they took
“their marching orders” from Rumsfeld.193  An Abu Ghraib guard said,
in a sworn statement:
I witnessed prisoners in the MI hold section, Wing 1A being made to do
various things that I would question morally.  In wing 1A we were told
that they had different rules and different SOP for treatment.  I never
saw a set of rules or SOP for that section just word of mouth.
194
Asked why he said nothing to authorities about abuses, he replied,
“‘Because I assumed that if they were doing things out of the ordi-
nary or outside the guidelines, someone would have said some-
thing.’”195
Some who had served in the military in fact had objected, both to
the withholding of Geneva protections and to the definitions of “tor-
ture” that seemed to allow mistreatment.  They included Secretary of
State Colin L. Powell, who had served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and a number of military
lawyers.196  But their objections drew little notice until after the Abu
192
See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 21, at 32, 43 (citing absence of copies at Iraq
prison sites); supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing lack of training); see also
Peter Baker, U.S. Authorizes Detention of Iraqi Civilians, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2003, at A23
(reporting U.S. position on applicable law in Iraq); John Mintz, Options on Handling of
Iraqi POWs Considered, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2003, at A20 (same).
193
The phrase appeared in e-mail correspondence; verbatim, it stated in part:
We (BAU and ITOS1) had also met with General’s Dunlevey & Miller explain-
ing our position (Law Enforcement techniques) vs. DoD.  Both agreed the
Bureau has their way of dong business and DoD has their marching orders
from the Sec Def.  Although the two techniques differed drastically, both
Generals believed they had a job to accomplish.
E-mail from [redacted], Div13, FBI, to T J. Harringtion, Div13, FBI (May 10, 2004,
12:26 PM), available at www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/t3131_3133.pdf (last visited
Mar. 22, 2005).
194
TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 21, at 18.
195
Id. at 19.
196
See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Ex-Military Lawyers Object to Bush Cabinet Nominee, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2004, at A36 (reporting that civilian executive officials ignored military
lawyers’ objections to memoranda); Government Press Release, Statement of Senator
Carl Levin Regarding the Nomination of Alberto Gonzales (Feb. 3, 2005) (citing oppo-
sition to detention and interrogation practices by “top military lawyers, including the
Legal Adviser to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Army’s Judge Advo-
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Ghraib scandal broke.  Thus at critical junctures relevant actors—not
only guards, but also military officers and FBI agents—were unsure of
what law applied and what were the contours of that law.197
Taguba’s report on abuse represented a return to the rule of mili-
tary law.  The report was remarkable for its factual depth and candor.
Its recitations of law, however, reflected a military perspective.  The
report limited its focus to two sources of law, the Army’s own regula-
tions and the 1949 Geneva Conventions.198  No mention was made, for
example, of the Convention Against Torture.  Also limited was the in-
quiry of the independent panel, which concluded that high-ranking
officers bore “institutional and personal responsibility,” but no legal
culpability.199  The panel further made note of its agreement with key
components of the Executive’s detention policy.  Expressly citing the
opinion of the plurality in Hamdi, it embraced the notion that the
country is at “war” and that at times, perhaps according to rules not
within any existing legal framework, the Executive may detain persons
seen as “enemy combatants.”200
cate General”), available at 2005 WLNR 2772043; Memorandum re:  Draft Decision
Memorandum for the President on the Applicability of the Geneva Convention to the
Conflict in Afghanistan, from Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State, to Counsel to the
President, and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Jan. 26, 2002)
(contending that decision to withhold protection would “reverse over a century of U.S.
policy and practice in supporting the Geneva Conventions and undermine the protec-
tions of the laws of war for our troops”), available at http://www.nytimes.com/ref/
international/24MEMO-GUIDE.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005), and available at
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.26.pdf (last visited
Mar. 22, 2005).
197
See Josh White, U.S. Generals in Iraq Were Told of Abuse Early, Inquiry Finds, WASH.
POST, Dec. 1, 2004, at A1 (describing undisclosed internal Army report which “con-
cluded that some U.S. arrest and detention practices at the time could ‘technically’ be
illegal”); E-Mail from [redacted], DL, FBI, to M C Briese (May 22, 2004, 2:08 PM) (stat-
ing that some FBI personnel had observed, at Abu Ghraib, military use of “techniques
beyond the bounds of FBI practice” but within the parameters of what author believed
were military’s orders, and seeking guidance on “the question of what constitutes
‘abuse’” that FBI agents must report), available at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/
released/FBI.121504.4940_4941.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
198
TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 21, at 3-5.  One leaked Army document, a brief
regarding proposed counter-resistance techniques of interrogation, did mention ex-
ternal sources such as the ICCPR, supra note 118, and Convention Against Torture,
supra note 16, but stressed that as a result of the existence of buffer mechanisms, “no
international body of law directly applies.”  Beaver Memorandum, supra note 32, at 1-2.
199
SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 59, at 5, 79-83.  The panel mentioned but did
not analyze the Convention Against Torture, supra note 16.  Id. at 94, 97.
200
See id. at 18, 27, 64, 81-82.  A similar willingness to rewrite Geneva law to com-
port with perceived needs of the war on terror may be found in THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT:  FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON
THE UNITED STATES 379-80 (W.W. Norton & Co. authorized ed. 2004).
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CONCLUSION
In time of war, wrote Telford Taylor, a lead U.S. prosecutor at
Nuremberg, laws:
[A]re necessary to diminish the corrosive effect of mortal combat on
the participants.  War does not confer a license to kill for personal rea-
sons—to gratify perverse impulses, or to put out of the way anyone who
appears obnoxious, or to whose welfare the soldier is indifferent.  War
is not a license at all, but an obligation to kill for reasons of state; it
does not countenance the infliction of suffering for its own sake or for
revenge.
201
Though focused on killing, the passage applies equally to the treat-
ment of captured combatants.  To declare “war”—whether a tradi-
tional struggle between nation-states or the current campaign against
terrorism—is to name an enemy.  Naming stirs resentment of that
identified other; resentment mounts in the heat of combat.  The de-
sire to inflict suffering, to win revenge, may become great.  When an
enemy falls into custody the desire is likely to be satisfied unless a
clear structure of constraints reinforces moral qualms about doing
harm.  U.S. armed forces long have operated within such a structure,
made up of internal regulations based on the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions on the laws of war.  Overlaying that framework today are other
bodies of law, other norm systems, that affect the civilian officials and
judicial officers who set and review detention policy no less than the
military personnel who implement it.  This legal landscape includes
law set forth in the Constitution, congressional enactments, and trea-
ties that the United States has ratified.  It includes other guideposts
for behavior as well, among them:  the history and values on which
U.S. law is founded; provisions in international declarations that the
United States has endorsed; and the views of governments and other
entities with which the United States shares a tradition of fundamental
rights and contemporary experience of fighting terrorism.  Taken to-
gether, these sources comprise a complex map of laws respecting
conditions of detention and methods of interrogation.
In the first years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, key ac-
tors did not see—did not acknowledge or accommodate—this lush
landscape of law.  The Executive singled out the Constitution’s Com-
mander-in-Chief Clauses as sufficient basis for its assertion that the
President enjoyed plenary power to combat terrorism as he saw fit.
The Supreme Court eventually rejected this position; however, the va-
201
TAYLOR, supra note 187, at 40-41.
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riety of rationales on which Justices relied evinced no consensus on
what sources of law mattered.  In any event, the Court’s affirmation of
its obligation to scrutinize the fact and conditions of detention came
too late to regulate treatment of the tens of thousands who had fallen
into military custody.  Within the zones of detention no law obtained.
The Executive’s declaration that Geneva law did not apply at Guan-
tánamo left the military unsure whether any rules applied.  Harsh
methods of interrogation—authorized, leaked documents later re-
vealed, by the Secretary of Defense—came into use.  Soon the tech-
niques found their way to Afghanistan and even to Iraq, despite ex-
ecutive assurances that it would apply Geneva law to Iraqi detainees.
The abuses that followed were, to quote one investigation, “entirely
predictable.”202  Photographs at Abu Ghraib exposed inflictions of suf-
fering, perversions like those to which Taylor’s passage referred.  Sub-
sequent revelations, in documents prepared by the armed forces, in
FBI memos, and in statements from detainees, demonstrated that
abuses had been widespread, and continued even after the Abu
Ghraib scandal broke.
The abuses pointed to failures of many sorts, in particular, failures
of planning and training.  There was also a failure of law:  the failure
to acknowledge and accommodate potentially relevant laws opened
space within which abuse recurred.  Conflict of laws, a field devoted to
recognition and reconciliation of disparate legal regimes, would seem
to provide a way of seeing and adjusting behavior to pertinent laws.
This has not proved to be so.  Traditionally conflicts has ceded trans-
national disputes to public international law.  Public international law
tolerates mechanisms like reservation and non-self-execution—on
which the Executive drew to support its detention and interrogation
policies—by which states cushion themselves against enforcement of
international obligations.  Even if conflicts doctrines were consulted,
they might not prove useful.  Challenges to detention are inherently
public disputes, and conflicts has tended to focus on private-law mat-
ters.  The field is, moreover, in flux; thus has Professor Gerald L.
Neuman observed that “conflict of laws is more in need of methodol-
ogy than itself a source of methodology.”203  Yet the very fact that there
is conflict within conflicts—as, indeed, there is within the discipline of
public international law—suggests the very real possibility for reforma-
tion of the way laws are seen within the United States.  The charting of
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an accurate map of America’s legal landscape constitutes a step in that
direction.  So too would further study of plural law in action, in socie-
ties as diverse as India and Europe.  Eventually, perhaps, the hooded
detainee may stand not as the icon of an unspeakable present but
rather as a relic of an awful past.
